Chinese experts reflect on Sino-U.S. relationship post Pelosi & drills

This newsletter is a collection of EXCLUSIVE interviews with 4 experts who shared their views with Beijing Channel.

The experts are

▲LI Chen, Associate Professor and International Security and Strategy Program Director at the School of International Studies at Renmin University of China

At present, the chain of command of the two militaries is still unimpeded, and the risks are still under control as long as the leaders on both sides adhere to bottom-line thinking on the issue of war and peace.

▲SHI Xiaoqin, PLA Sr. Colonel (Retired), Research fellow at School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University

In the long run, these military exercises might be a watershed event.

▲CAO Qun, Associate research fellow at the Department for American Studies, China Institute of International Studies

Military-to-military relations will not spiral out of control just because these mechanisms are removed.

And last but not least

▲Victor Gao, Vice Director, Center for China and Globalization, Chair Professor of Soochow University

As for the Sino-U.S relationship, Washington hopes to compartmentalize bilateral ties with China with their cooperation, competition and confrontation approach. That’s wishful thinking on the part of Washington.

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**Disclaimer: The views expressed by the interviewees do not necessarily reflect that of this newsletter, Xinhua News Agency, and the Chinese official position**

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▲LI Chen, Associate Professor and International Security and Strategy Program Director at the School of International Studies at Renmin University.

The positioning of the military relationship between China and the U.S has actually elevated in recent years. In the past, Beijing and Washington emphasized their economic and trade relations were the ballast stone of bilateral ties. Over the last two or three years, there has been a new formulation that the military-to-military relations as other aspects of China-U.S. relations have deteriorated.

The significance of "military relations are the ballast stone" is that with many setbacks in bilateral relations and rising hostility, any major problems that arise in military relations would have an overall impact on bilateral relations. It should be recognized that there is a certain consensus between China and the United States on this. However, the disagreement is that the U.S. side believes as long as it maintains operational-level management & control and strategic-level communication, there is no need for them to respond to China's various concerns on security and military issues. Then they can do whatever they think is at low risk, which harms China’s security interests.

On the other hand, the U.S. side now is hard to move forward with mil-to-mil relations due to its domestic politics, even from a professional point of view that the U.S. and China have room for further progress on some issues.

So, the two sides have conflicting ideas, and the Chinese side on various occasions has been hoping that the U.S. can change its ideas and practices, but so far the effect is not particularly positive.

The Taiwan question is a matter of China's core interests. As Deng Xiaoping once told then U.S. President Ronald Reagan decades ago that if there is a major change over the Taiwan question due to the U.S. side, China will safeguard its core interests, even if there could be some setback in China-U.S. relations, and such a cost we need to bear. So, these three countermeasures (cancelling the three mil-to-mil dialogues) show our determination as Pelosi’s Taiwan trip is indeed very serious in nature.

Although Pelosi's visit to Taiwan ostensibly did not involve the U.S. federal government, the Taiwan question is, after all, involved in every aspect of China-U.S. relations, including security relations. Were the Taiwan question not well managed and the situation escalates, it will only have a greater impact on the security relationship between the two countries and militaries. These countermeasures are a necessary warning sent to the U.S.

In terms of these three measures, talks between China-U.S. theatre commanders are not a regular or normalized mechanism so far; the China-U.S. Defense Policy Coordination Talks are relatively frequent at the working level. But if some major incidents occur, the two sides still need senior-level officials or even leaders to communicate and make decisions.

The third is the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement, which does have a long history in China-U.S. military relationship, with the two sides meeting almost annually to discuss maritime security issues, but mainly at the operational level.

Therefore, these three mechanisms do not represent the entirety of the security relationship between the two militaries, which means that even if these three are cancelled for a short period, there are still channels open.

The hotline between the U.S. and Chinese defence departments remains. The military attachés of embassies in two capitals can communicate with each other's relevant departments. At the operational level, agreements like the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) adopted by the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and the two MOUs are still working.

One last point, the military and defence departments act differently from other government agencies. At present, the chain of command of the two militaries is still unimpeded, and the risks are still under control as long as the leaders on both sides adhere to bottom-line thinking on the issue of war and peace.

Indeed, these necessary countermeasures may have a negative impact in terms of dealing with the potential escalation of frictions. However, there is still some operational leeway for restoration of these mechanisms, or in other forms, if the situation improves. Also, if one reads the announcement of these countermeasures literally, it still leaves room for interpretation of whether what is being cancelled are the entire mechanisms or just some specific meetings or arrangements in the near future.

▲SHI Xiaoqin, PLA Sr. Colonel (Retired), Research fellow at School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University

The PLA has long been pursuing a national defence policy that is defensive in nature, and the military exercises were a stress test in response to the current situation. U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan was a major move in Washington’s attempt to hollow out the one-China principle in recent years, which might likely trigger a Domino effect. In response, the PLA launched these real combat exercises to offset the momentum of U.S. provocation and restore a balanced posture over the Taiwan question.

The PLA no longer took a restrained approach as in the past. Its aircraft and warships crossed the median line of the strait, flew missiles over the island and established exercise zones circling it. These moves marked a deviation from the PLA's tradition of confining itself to the mainland side in previous drills. It demonstrates PLA's transformation from an offshore military to a long-distance operation force and a major change in its decision-making.

Meanwhile, the PLA is fully aware of the possibility of crisis escalation. The PLA publicly stated that the exercises were conventional missile drills. The United States said it would postpone the Minuteman III ICBM test. These interactions demonstrated basic strategic trust between the two great powers. The PLA exercises also took into account the busy international air and sea lanes around the island in response to international concerns.

The strategic goal of the PLA remains deterrence. The duration and scale of the exercise were solid evidence of Beijing’s great wrath but also a restrained attitude showing its will and capability.

The objectives of these deterrence-oriented exercises are also clear, which are against the separatists in Taiwan and the foreign forces that support “Taiwan independence.” The PLA demonstrated: that they are capable of “encircling but not fighting”; they could conduct surgical strikes and divide the island into several pieces; and they also could launch “Golden Bell strikes” with land, naval, air, space and electronic & cyber forces.

These theatre-level exercises were carried out by the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command, and it serves as a test of the new combat operational command system since the military reform of 2015. The exercises examine the joint and integrated operations between arms and services in the theatre, the chain of command between military services and the theatre as well as the capability of rapid response.

In the long run, these military exercises might be a watershed event. The U.S. government recently clarified its one-China policy has not changed, and it does not support Taiwan’s independence. However, the political fallout from Pelosi’s Taiwan trip would continue, with the state of policy on the Taiwan question that has been established over the past 50 years through a series of maneuvers might be disrupted. It is not the military exercises but the provocation by Pelosi that led to the negative effects on international politics. The PLA military exercises are only responsive, defensive, and deterrent.

First, in the context of the “Indo-Pacific Strategy”, the U.S. intends to take “integrated deterrence” as the guidelines, bringing in allies and partners working across the nuclear and conventional deterrence. These PLA exercises might accelerate U.S. efforts to integrate Taiwan into its “integrated deterrence” network.

Second, the U.S. might make adjustments to its regional military posture. U.S. military’s forward presence in the Asia Pacific could be replaced by a far-peripheries presence in the region. This time the U.S. aircraft carriers operated farther away from Taiwan island than they were during the 1996 Taiwan crisis. The PLA advancing and the U.S. forces somewhat retreating will be a clear trend in development. To balance its weakening position at sea, the U.S. military may increase its land-based military deployments in Asia or make other tactical adjustments.

Third, Japan, which is within the firing range of the PLA, probably will use this drill as an excuse to increase its military expenditure, expand its military strength, strengthen its alliance with the U.S., firmly collude with “Taiwan independence” separatist forces, or even abandon its Peace Constitution.

Fourth, the Taiwan authorities will reassess their position, especially the U.S. determination and capability to defend Taiwan.

It is worth noting that on August 5, China announced 8 countermeasures in response to Nancy Pelosi’s Visit to Taiwan, three of which are related to the military: cancelling the China-U.S. Theater Commanders Talk; cancelling China-U.S. Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCT); cancelling China-U.S. Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) meetings.

At a time when communication and dialogue are urgently needed, the removal of these communication channels will inevitably raise concerns about the prospect of miscalculation and difficulty in timely communication when unexpected events occur. These communication channels have been built through long and arduous efforts. They guarantee the minimum strategic trust between two militaries and reassure other concerned parties. Fortunately, the list of countermeasures only cancelled the practice of talks and meetings without eliminating these mechanisms, which preserves the basis for resuming communication and exchanges in the future.

Comments outside China about the PLA exercises further irritated Beijing. These justifiable and restrained countermeasures are interpreted as escalating, coercive, dangerous, provocative, irresponsible, etc. In the age of social media, one-sided interpretations circulate quickly and widely, unsettling the court of public opinion worldwide. This gap in interpretation is not conducive to the stability of the Taiwan Strait and the international situation. It calls for timely dialogue and exchanges among the strategic, journalistic, and commentary communities to accurately understand each other’s intentions.

▲CAO Qun, Associate research fellow at the Department for American Studies, China Institute of International Studies

The differences in understanding between the two militaries are a long-standing problem. In April, the Defense Ministers of China and the United States had a video call, during which the two sides reached a consensus on managing differences and strengthening communication. But there have always been differences between the two militaries: the U.S. military has put more emphasis on technical aspects, such as how to deal with encounters at sea and in the air more professionally; China, in turn, has stressed that the United States should reduce such military actions that are provocative or endanger China’s national security interests.

There have been some positive interactions between the Chinese and U.S. militaries, such as the signing of CUES (Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea) at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in 2014, followed by the signing of two MOUs (Memorandum of Understanding), all of which demonstrate that the two militaries have the basis of mutual trust and the ability to handle encounters professionally. But even so, differences in the perception of military exchanges have not been resolved.

Among the countermeasures, China cancelled China-U.S. Theater Commanders Talk, China-U.S. Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCT), and China-U.S. Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) meetings. The MMCA signed in 1998 is the first agreement on military confidence-building measures between the two countries. It has worked well for a long time but gradually entered a bottleneck period.

However, despite the cancellation of the three mechanisms, there are still other communication channels between China and the U.S., such as the Defense Telephone Link (DTL) and the Joint Strategic Dialogue Mechanism (JSDM). The JSDM was signed in 2017, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley called his Chinese counterpart Gen. Li Zuocheng twice in 20 and 21 to assure him that the two countries would not suddenly go to war. This shows that China has taken the concerns of the U.S. into account this time.

In addition, there is always room for policy flexibility. As long as the U.S. returns to the path of meeting China halfway, the resumption of these mechanisms is possible. The MMCA was suspended for a year in 2020 under the Trump administration but was reinstated in 2021.

The guardrails between China and the United States still exist, and the chances of a military clash between China and the United States arising from Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan are slim. And military-to-military relations will not spiral out of control because these mechanisms are removed. The U.S. will continue to criticize China diplomatically, and the U.S.-Japan ties will be further strengthened. China needs to maintain a strategic focus and refute all statements made by foreign countries that are not in line with the facts. The struggle between China and the United States is still at the level of diplomacy, public opinion and international law but not military.

At the same time, the United States might instigate some European countries to follow suit to send delegations to Taipei. Such moves will impact China-EU relations and economic and trade development, which is what we should be worried about.

▲Victor Gao, Vice Director, Center for China and Globalization, Chair Professor of Soochow University

Beijing's responses to Pelosi’s visit changed many fundamental pretexts of the Taiwan question. First, the so-called median line was crossed. Second, the military drills surrounding Taiwan, which is for the audience of the United States, Taiwan, and U.S. allies such as Japan. This is to show that Beijing is much more seriously considering the great cause of reunification than before and is increasingly ready back it up with action.

But Beijing needs to make these military drills sink in so that the separatist forces in Taiwan are fully deterred from seeking to break away.  

Beijing must closely monitor if Taiwan separatists make a drastic move, such as drafting and issuing public statements for independence. It may not be directly carried out by the Taiwan authorities nor be specifically titled as a declaration of independence, but it will certainly paint Taiwan as a victim and Beijing as an aggressor. Such a move will not have Taiwan’s best interest at heart.

There still are some ambiguities and misunderstandings in the international community regarding our policy over the Taiwan questions. Beijing needs to be as clear-cut as possible in explaining policies so that the international community gets the correct and accurate ones.

As for the Sino-U.S relationship, Washington hopes to compartmentalize bilateral ties with China with their cooperation, competition and confrontation approach. That’s wishful thinking on the part of Washington.

Cooperation and communication are important between China and the United States. After Pelosi’s visit, some mechanisms were cancelled while others were halted. These are necessary countermeasures against the United States. But we don’t want them to be severed forever.

Liu Lin, Lu Jia’nan, and Sun Mengqi, who intern for Beijing Channel, contributed to this newsletter.

**This newsletter is managed by Liu Yang in a personal capacity and is unrelated to his role as a Xinhua employee.**

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