Chinese experts weigh in on Pelosi's possible Taiwan visit

On the occasion of the latest phone call between the Chinese and U.S. leaders, Beijing Channel has reached out to a group of veteran foreign policy experts to hear their takes.

In this newsletter you’ll see them address the following issues:

1. What signal did the phone conversation send out

2. How China sees the possible Pelosi visit to Taiwan, and a forecast of potential response from Beijing

3. After Biden repeatedly misspoke on the U.S. posture on Taiwan, does China still buy Washington’s strategic ambiguity

4. Thoughts on moving forward with crisis management

▲SHEN Yamei, Director of Department for American Studies, China Institute of International Studies

The U.S. may find the strategy of using Taiwan to contain China tempting, but it is actually a trap.

Two Leaders had phone calls for another time after four months. The two calls were held in a rather different context. Their conversations last time were more about the Ukraine crisis, which was a series of exchanges between the two powers to stabilize the international situation, as well as to enhance understanding of their respective positions.

This time, high-level interactions between the two powers have recently increased. Both sides strongly demand stability in Sino-American relations. This call would have been a good opportunity to promote bilateral relations. However, the potential crisis hidden in China-U.S. relations has been heating up due to the Taiwan question, particularly U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s possible visit to Taiwan.

Head of State diplomacy has always played a leading role in China-U.S. relations, which is also the case for this time. It is, to a certain extent, a safety net or stabilization anchor that eases the tension between the two sides.

The Taiwan question can be a tool for any American politician - not just Pelosi – to leverage. Given the current development of China-U.S. relations and the U.S. assessment of the international situation and bilateral relations, the Taiwan question is being largely distorted.

The rise of China aggravates the strategic competition between the two powers. The U.S. finds it has lost the initiative and thus needs to use Taiwan as a leveraging tool to force China to submit to its strategic design, which has never been changed. What has been changing is the international situation and the Ukraine crisis. It needs to use the Taiwan question to prove its ability to control the situation and its credibility among allies.

In doing so, the U.S. is in danger of falling into a trap: the U.S. believes that it is making an effort to maintain its credibility or at least preserve its credibility, which is declining, on the Taiwan question, but in fact, it is challenging the one-China principle, destructing the political basis of U.S.-China relations and stepping on the red line of global peace, security and stability, which in turn leads to a decline in its credibility. The U.S. may find the strategy of using Taiwan to contain China tempting, but it is actually a trap.

Some debate on Chinese media over how to counter the U.S. moves over Taiwan may be taken into consideration by some in Washington. With domestic political agendas moving forward, neither side wants to cross the line on major issues, especially those concerning China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Even so, the U.S. and China are both prudent in crisis management. The pursuit of stability in China-U.S. relations is strongly shared between the two militaries. However, it is also clear that China and the U.S. are not on the same page over crisis management and control.

On the one hand, the crisis control mechanism does play an assurance and underpinning role; but on the other hand, it opens the door to the worst-case scenario, allowing the U.S. to push against China’s borderline increasingly recklessly, which is not something we want to see. We still hope that U.S.-China relations will get back on track rather than moving forward in a guaranteed crisis.

The U.S. side speaks of crisis control as a kind of guardrail, but China talks about the fact that Sino-U.S. relations should be on the right track - if the U.S. and China are on the wrong track, then the guardrail will only make both sides move further and further down the wrong road.

▲ZHU Feng, Dean of School of international relations, Nanjing University

China and the United States cannot wait until something goes wrong before they figure out how to respond.

The Thursday phone call lasted over two hours, which was very much needed and had significant political and policy implications for both sides.

The call must have touched on the issue of Pelosi's reported plan to visit Taiwan. From the perspective of U.S. domestic politics, Pelosi, the U.S. House Speaker, is a senior leader of the legislative branch, and it seems difficult for Biden to effectively control her travel plans. But why does Pelosi want to visit Taiwan? In large part is personal political motives, as her political career is ending.

The Asia-Pacific region needs stability, which requires strengthened dialogue and cooperation between China and the United States. Pelosi's plan to visit Taiwan out of personal political motives will only inflame the instability of the Taiwan Strait. Therefore, no matter how much so-called practical interests out of her political ambition, her visit will further deepen suspicion between China and the United States on the Taiwan question and make the situation across the Taiwan Straits more volatile.

The U.S. emphasizes to China that the One China policy has not changed, while its actions keep subverting the policy. The Biden administration must show the Chinese people respect and trust in handling China policy. The United States must walk the talk on the One China policy.

Beijing will not sit idly but respond strongly if Pelosi visits Taiwan, with possible options of imposing a no-fly zone or conducting military exercises. And if the U.S. military is involved or escorts her to Taiwan, the risk of military conflict would greatly increase.

Whether Pelosi's visit could be postponed or cancelled is, to a large extent, a test of the mature and rational political thinking and strategic vision that the leadership of the United States should have.

The stability of China-US relations requires a clear and firm determination on both sides. That is, no matter how fierce the strategic competition between China and the United States is, it must be in a manageable condition. Maintaining communication and dialogue is an important approach for a manageable bilateral relationship and a major strategic test for two countries. Direct face-to-face communications between the two governments and militaries are shrinking due to COVID-19. Without a rapid restoration, suspicion and mistrust will be reinforced.

On the other hand, we can also learn the right lesson from the past. There have been several incidents like warship collisions in the Black Sea during the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. China and the United States cannot wait until something goes wrong before they figure out how to respond. Two governments and militaries must learn from the past lessons and work in advance.

▲DA Wei, Director, Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University

Both sides will feel that they can not back down. The tit-for-tat will develop into a scary vicious cycle.

I don't think the call results from the Taiwan question or Pelosi’s intended visit. It is the continuation of the diplomatic arrangements between the two countries and part of a process.

The frequency of communication between the two sides has clearly accelerated in recent months which shows that both sides are making an effort to maintain and deepen channels of communication despite difficulties in the bilateral relationship. Among these efforts, the most important one, of course, is the phone call between the top leaders.

The calls show that the top leadership of the two countries are trying to prevent the worst from happening, actively searching for areas of cooperation and managing risks.

Whether viewed from the lens of U.S. domestic politics or the interaction between China and the United States, the topic of Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, once opened, is particularly dangerous. From the perspective of American domestic politics, Pelosi and the Democratic Party have found themselves in a tight spot. The same can be said of China after word of Pelosi’s plan got out, That is, if Pelosi were to visit Taiwan, China is compelled to impose countermeasures. Of course, it is China’s hope that the relationship is stable, but if the United States crosses the line, it would be impossible for China to sit on its hands. As was mentioned in the phone call yesterday, “public opinion cannot be defied.”

Should China react, I expect Washington, like the U.S. Congress, to further react. Then this will not be only a matter of military or tension across the Taiwan Strait. Both sides will feel that they can not back down. The tit-for-tat will develop into a scary vicious cycle.

Judging by the readout of the two sides after the phone call, China spent a lot of time explaining the situation, making Taiwan possibly the single most important topic during the phone call. But Washington was rather mute on the matter, as one gathers from its readout.

There are some existing crisis management mechanisms between China and the United States, such as protocols of air and sea encounters. In my understanding, frontline operators of both countries have demonstrated professionalism. But dangers can not be ruled out. In a thousand encounters, danger may arise from one, So there is a definite need for crisis management.

Though I believe we should press forward concerning crisis management, but I realize that it is rather difficult in the short term. The current state of bilateral ties makes undermines talks over crisis management. Moreover, both sides have different emphases. The United States prefers to discuss technical issues, like how to operate after the ship meets, how far the distance should be, how to take a turn or how to greet each other.

While the Chinese side wants to focus on the strategic aspect, that is, there won’t be any issue if the United States doesn’t show up at all. I think China has a point. China believes that the United States is trying to provoke China in a safe manner, but in China’s eyes, both countries would be much safer off if the United States did not provoke in the first place. The two are not speaking on the same wavelength.

On strategic ambiguity, it is a long-term practice of the United States, but it is not a commitment of the United States, nor is it its policy or even an official word. The word is used by the academic community, not in an official way.

But in any case, for a long time, the United States remained strategically ambiguous. With the changes in China-US relations and the situation in the Taiwan Strait, the United States feels that the original practice of using strategic ambiguity to deter China may become less and less feasible.

There is growing pressure in the United States to move from ambiguity to clarity, and its purpose is to strengthen deterrence against China. The U.S. policy has not changed, which is still vague, but domestic pressure exists. Because of the vocal China hawks, the chorus of calling for more deterrence against China is getting louder.

So the more rational voice and the traditional establishments are arguing against strategic clarity and want to maintain strategic ambiguity, but I think they are under increasing pressure. Five or six years ago, no one talked about this topic at all. Now the talk is getting louder, which shows that in the entire strategic community, this demand is indeed getting higher. But in the relatively small circles of China hands, I think they are mostly against strategic clarity. Will the United States move toward strategic clarity in the future? I think it is pretty hard. Because strategic clarity would demand extensive military evaluation, including the credibility of commitments to its allies and the potential scenarios that could put its commitments to the test. I don't think there is much chance of a switch in the short term.

But the debate will continue, and so will the pressure. Whether it will become a policy in the future also depends on how Beijing and Washington interact and how things go on across the Taiwan Strait. If the situation in the Taiwan Strait and China-US relations are getting tenser and the two countries become hostile, perhaps the impulse of the United States to choose strategic clarity will be stronger.

▲YU Tiejun, Vice President of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Peking University

If not well managed and controlled, the consequences might be more serious than that of the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the Hainan EP-3 incident in 2001.

If not well managed and controlled, the consequences might be more serious than that of the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the Hainan EP-3 incident in 2001.

The phone call between Xi and Biden was their first conversation in four months.

I think this shows that on the one hand, top leaders on both sides have good intentions to communicate with each other and manage their differences and that they attach importance to China-U.S. relations and have patience and will to deal with problems. On the other hand, it also shows that bilateral relations are indeed complicated and full of challenges that communication between top leaders is needed to address issues that exist in between, suggesting the seriousness of those issues.

Among all the critical issues, the Taiwan question are certainly the most important ones. Since the Trump administration hollowed out the one-China policy, the U.S. has been pushing toward China's red line step by step. My judgment is that the Trump administration's approach continues to this day and has not changed.

This phone call received all the attention because people were concerned about another Taiwan Strait crisis.

Some U.S. scholars believed that Pelosi's insistence on visiting Taiwan could trigger a new crisis, one that could be more dangerous than previous crises in the Taiwan Strait in 1950s and 1990s. The Taiwan question also involve domestic politics on both sides, either side will face great pressure to back down.

The strategic competition between China and the U.S. may thus become more intense - reaching an unprecedented level - and the corresponding crisis management task will be particularly difficult.

The Chinese side has so far yet to say any specific countermeasures. However, it is certain that, first, China will certainly take countermeasures; second, those measures may be unprecedented. The two sides are still in contact on top levels, continuing to seek opportunities of communicating with each other on the Taiwan question. Although neither of the two sides wants to see this escalates to the military level, their respective military preparations must be underway - the U.S. aircraft carrier has already sailed over, and China will prepare militarily accordingly.

If Pelosi were to visit Taiwan, the tensions would be certainly on an upward spiral. The problem now is that both sides are communicating around sensitive issues, which is very unpromising.

The overall atmosphere of the current bilateral relations is very tense, with China and the U.S. battling it out, and domestic politics - such as public opinion – of each side builds tension, too, lacking in the role of any constructive factors to ease the situation at the moment.

If not well managed and controlled, the consequences might be more serious than that of the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the Hainan EP-3 incident in 2001.

▲CHEN Qi, professor at the Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University

"Now it’s up to who blinks first. I think it’s likely the U.S."

One of the main topics in this conversation was the positioning of the China-US relationship. The Chinese readout expressed dissatisfaction with the U.S. framing the China-U.S. relationship as a strategic competition.

The other core issue is the Taiwan question. The fundamental reason for the concern over Taiwan is the recent salami-slicing tactic employed by Washington, if not a substantive policy rollback. On top of that Pelosi’s expressed intention to visit Taiwan came as a big shock. So China felt it needs to send a firm and clear signal that if Pelosi visits Taiwan, China’s reaction may exceed expectations. I think the range of policy options that Hu Xijin (Former editor-in-chief of the Global Times) has outlined could possibly be adopted by China. In that case, it will be difficult to maintain the status quo of the Taiwan situation. From Washington’s perspective, I think Biden is trying to push China’s policy red line.

Against the setting of the upcoming party congress, China is determined to create a favourable domestic and international environment for it to be successful. A big exterior shock would undoubtedly interfere with the domestic political agenda.  That said, if there is a change in the external environment, China will unlikely show weakness. There’s not much room to maneuver in this matter, so Beijing has to make contingency plans, including military, to be fully prepared.

The same is true in the U.S. If the Democrats can’t score on domestic issues, they will try to win back on foreign policy. So I suppose a visit to Taiwan could be a potential win for the Democratic Party, but it’s hard to know if it can win them votes. If the Democrats can achieve a breakthrough at a small cost, they may calculate that at least they won’t lose points.

Now it’s up to who blinks first. I think it’s likely the U.S. A military conflict over Taiwan will be too difficult to handle for Washington. The U.S. is not ready for a military conflict with China. China, I think, is also not ready for it. But generally speaking, this is a strategic game of mentality and a test of who is more composed. From this point of view, the U.S. might blink first because China’s firm determination is a more effective signal of deterrence.

Disclaimer: The views expressed by the interviewees do not necessarily reflect that of this newsletter, Xinhua News Agency, and the Chinese official position.

Beijing Channel interns Li Chunmiao, Liu Lin and Sun Mengqi contributed to this newsletter.