Chinese scholars respond to Trump 2.0
Chinese experts are wary of the shockwaves coming from Trump's second term
As the dust is (almost) settled in the U.S. presidential election, which yielded Donald Trump as the winner, China-based U.S. watchers weigh in on what this would mean for the United States, U.S.-China ties, and the global order in general.
This newsletter offers a compilation of public-available takes from notable Chinese scholars, to shed light on how China is digesting the election outcome.
Without further ado:
△ Jia Qingguo spoke on the impact of the U.S. presidential election on the China-U.S. relationship recently at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. The following is not a transcript but is paraphrased from his English speech by Lianhe Zaobao.
Jia is a professor at Peking University.
Before Trump came to power in 2016, there were advantages and disadvantages for China if a Republican or a Democrat won the U.S. presidential election. The election of a Republican candidate traditionally meant that the new administration would practice free trade and would put less pressure on China over trade deficits and human rights, but it would also strengthen military alliances against China, provide Taiwan with more security assistance, and directly provoke Chinese sovereignty.
Traditionally China valued continuity in Washington's policies and hoped that the incumbent party would win the election to save a teething phase when a new administration took office. If there is party rotation in the White House and the handover between two presidents is sometimes rushed and incomplete, there could be surprises and sources of friction in the U.S.-China engagement. But the above situation has changed dramatically since Trump took office in 2016, with Republicans no longer supporting free trade and Democrats becoming more proactive on Taiwan.
There are two cautionary points in this U.S. presidential election, one is that Trump could be more unpredictable. The other is that more Republican politicians, especially members of the House, have been more ruthless, provocative and sometimes racist in their policies toward China than Democrats.
Trump’s second term is expected to include more provocations against China over Taiwan, higher trade tariffs on Chinese exports to the United States, doubling down on the “small yard, high fence” strategy to restrict high-tech exports, politicizing people-to-people exchanges, and the possibility of sanctions against China over the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
No matter who ends up in the White House, U.S. policy toward China will continue to be tough and even hostile. China must prepare for what may happen by accelerating its military modernization to defend its core interests, developing its economy well, and avoiding involvement in accidental military conflicts in the South China Sea and Taiwan, as well as avoiding unnecessary disputes with the outside world.
China should insist on doing the right thing, including maintaining dialogues and consultations at different levels to find ways to handle differences and protect common interests. At the same time, China should continue to open up to the outside world, promote exchanges between Chinese and foreigners, and build good relations, especially with its immediate Asian neighbors, and cooperate with moderate and pragmatic actors who are friendly to the United States.
朗普2016年上台前，无论共和党还是民主党在美国总统选举中胜选，对中国都各有利弊。共和党候选人当选，传统上意味着新政府将实行自由贸易，在贸易逆差和人权问题上会减少对中国施压，但同时也会加强对华军事联盟，提供台湾更多安全协助，直接挑衅中国主权。
中国早年更看重华盛顿政策的延续性，并希望当政者所属政党胜选，以在新政府上台后省去磨合阶段。如果白宫出现政党轮替，两任总统交接有时仓促且不完整，中美接触就可能出现意外和摩擦源。但上述情况自特朗普2016年执政后出现巨大变化，共和党不再支持自由贸易，民主党在台湾问题上也变得更积极主动。
这届美国总统选举中有两点值得警醒，一方面是特朗普更情绪化、更难以预测。另一方面是与民主党人相比，更多共和党政客尤其众议员的对华政策更无情、具挑衅性，有时还带有种族主义。
因为他第二任内预计会在台湾问题上更多挑衅中国，对中国输美商品加征更高贸易关税，限制高科技出口的“小院高墙”、院墙将变得更大更高，中美人员交流也会更政治化安全化，中国还可能因俄乌冲突问题遭遇制裁。
无论谁最终入主白宫，美国对华政策都将继续强硬甚至敌对。中国必须为可能发生的一切做好准备，加快军事现代化捍卫核心利益，发展好经济，并在南中国海、台湾等地避免卷入偶发军事冲突，同时避免与外界产生不必要的争端。
中国应坚持做对的事，包括保持不同层次的对话和磋商，找到处理分歧和保护共同利益的方法。中国同时应持续对外开放，促进中外人员交流，并尤其与亚洲近邻建立良好关系，与友美温和务实者合作。
△ Wu Xinbo, as interviewed by Jiemian News
Wu is a professor at Shanghai’s Fudan University.
A re-elected Trump will “walk the talk” on imposing tariffs on imports. Tariffs are not just a negotiating tool for Trump, but also an ideology that Trump believes is good for the U.S. and an effective economic policy tool.
Whether the tariffs on Chinese goods will reach 60 percent will vary depending on the specific types of goods. Duty on goods that the U.S. must import from China may not hit 60%.
In addition to Trump himself, the “extreme hawks” on China in the new Trump administration will not only push for decoupling from China economically but also intensify confrontation with China on security issues, including Taiwan.
As a result, China-U.S. relations will fluctuate dramatically in the next four years, with escalating tensions, intensifying confrontation, and perhaps even a major crisis. The space for China-U.S. cooperation will be drastically compressed after Trump's administration, and the topics of cooperation will shrink, such as jointly tackling climate change.
The United States still needs China's cooperation on drug control. Compared to the Biden administration, the cooperation component of the U.S.-China relationship under Trump will be significantly reduced, and the positive effect of cooperation on bilateral relations will be very, very limited.
Another change with Trump's return will be a decline in engagement between the U.S. and China, both at the official level and in the private sector. “Extreme hawks” in the Trump administration have also advocated a reduction in diplomatic engagement with China and a decrease in social exchanges between the two countries.
When Trump takes office, even if the Democrats take the House of Representatives, it won't have much of an impact on China policy. The Democrats will pressure Trump on domestic issues when they take control of the House, but on tariffs against China, the Democrats are also generally in favor of tariff increases, so there won't be much of a hold on Trump.
With Trump's increased support for Israel, there is also the potential for further escalation of the conflict in the Middle East after he returns to the White House.
Harris has lost the election mainly because of economic and immigration policies. High inflation and high interest rates during the Biden administration, coupled with the influx of about 10 million illegal immigrants along the U.S.-Mexico border since he took office has sparked discontent among U.S. voters. Harris, who was Biden's deputy, was originally at a disadvantage on these two issues of greatest concern to voters, but she has failed to offer clear and effective solutions, while Trump has proposed tax cuts that are popular with voters.
如果特朗普再次当选，对进口商品加征关税将“说到做到”。加征关税对特朗普而言不仅仅是谈判手段，还是其相信的理念，特朗普认为加征关税对美国有利并且是有效的经济政策手段。
对中国商品征收的关税会不会达到60%，要取决于美国从中国进口商品的具体种类，美国必须从中国进口商品的征税可能不会这么高。
除了特朗普本人，特朗普新政府中的对华极端鹰派不仅会在经济上推动与中国脱钩，还会在安全问题上加剧与中国的对抗，包括中国台湾问题。
“这样一来，中美关系在今后4年会出现大幅度波动，紧张升级、对抗加剧，甚至可能会出现重大危机。”特朗普执政后中美合作的空间将大幅压缩，合作议题将缩水，比如共同应对气候变化。特朗普是气候变化怀疑论者，曾带美国退出巴黎气候协定。
在美国的毒品管控、芬太尼问题上，美国依然需要中国的合作。总体来看相比拜登政府，特朗普再次执政后中美关系中的合作成分将大幅减少，合作对双边关系的正面作用也会“非常非常有限”。
特朗普回归的另一个变化是中美两国之间的交往，无论是官方层面还是民间都会下降。特朗普政府中的极端鹰派也主张在外交上减少与中国接触，降低两国在社会层面的交流。
特朗普上台时，即便民主党拿下众议院，在对华政策上也不会产生太大影响。民主党控制众议院后会在内政问题上向特朗普施压，但在对华关税上，民主党总体也支持加征关税，因此“不会对特朗普有太多牵制”。
由于特朗普对以色列的支持更加没有底线，他如果重返白宫，中东的冲突还有可能进一步升级。
哈里斯在民调中之所以没能保持住领先势头，主要是因为经济和移民政策。拜登执政时期的高通胀和高利率，再加上其上任以来美墨边境有约1000万非法移民涌入引发了美国选民不满。在这两个选民最关注的议题上，作为拜登副手的哈里斯原本就处于不利地位，但她没有提出明确有效的解决方案，特朗普则提出了受选民们欢迎的减税。
△ Liu Weidong, as interviewed by Jiemian News
Liu is a fellow at the Insitute of American Studies, CASS
In his early days, Trump may exert overwhelming pressure on China, and then start to bargain. He will assess what goods can be increased by 60% of the tax, and what goods can not.”
The 2024 Republican Party platform was formulated around Trump, so it's very likely that he'll follow some of those elements to fulfill his promises. In response to Project 2025, while Trump has vigorously denied any connection, that doesn't mean he won't adopt parts of it.
Trump's initial focus after taking office will still be on domestic issues, and the vast majority of the Republican Party platform is about U.S. domestic issues. Pressure on China may not be his focus, but he will certainly do some things as well.
In terms of pressuring China, Trump's perception of the U.S.-China relationship focuses mainly on the economic and trade sphere, so the first moves he will take when he comes to power may include canceling China's most favored nation status, imposing a 60 percent tariff, and imposing higher tariffs on electric cars that Chinese companies manufacture in Mexico and then export to the United States.
On the global fight against climate change, Trump could take the U.S. out of the Paris climate agreement again, stop government funding for new energy use, and renew support for oil and gas resource extraction on his first day in office. He would take immediate action on the issue as a signature move to fulfill his promises to conservatives just after taking office.
The reason Harris lost is because she has not seized the momentum of a good start, been forthright and clear about her policy positions, and has been ambiguous on many issues, Harris' only focus is on defeating Trump, but that's not what voters are most concerned about.
特朗普在执政初期可能给中国一个“泰山压顶”式的施压，之后再开始开条件，“他会评估什么商品能加60%的税，什么商品不能。”
2024共和党纲领就是围绕特朗普制定的，“所以他很有可能会按照其中的一些内容来兑现自己的承诺。”针对“2025计划”，虽然特朗普极力否认与该计划之间的关系，但并不意味着他不会采用其中的部分内容。
特朗普上台后初期的重点依然会放在国内议题上，共和党纲领中绝大部分内容都是关于美国内政议题。“对华施压可能不是他的重点，但他一定也会做一些事情。”
在对华施压上，特朗普对于中美关系的认知主要聚焦在经贸领域，因此他上台后首先采取的举措可能包括取消中国的最惠国待遇、征收60%关税、对中企在墨西哥生产再向美国出口的电动车加征更高关税。
如果特朗普上台，他大概率将兑现承诺，用停止美国对乌克兰武器出口或者其他方式迫使乌克兰接受停火。
在全球应对气候变化上，特朗普上台后可能会在第一天就带美国再次退出巴黎气候协定、停止对新能源使用的政府资助、重新支持油气资源开采。
“他会在刚刚上任的阶段就立刻采取行动，把该问题作为对保守派兑现承诺的一个标志性举措。”
哈里斯优势不再的原因在于没有抓住开局良好的势头、坦率明确自己的政策立场，在很多问题上模棱两可，“哈里斯唯一关注的是击败特朗普，但这并不是选民最关注的问题。”
△ Wang Dong, as interviewed by China Review News
Wang is a professor at Peking University
Overall, “Trump 2.0” is likely to be more destructive than the 2017 version. Compared with his first administration, the views of Trump have not changed much, but the domestic situation and international environment in the United States have changed dramatically, and Trump's understanding of how to utilize the executive power of the presidency has conceivably change as well.
Compared with the time during Trump’s first administration, the United States now faces an environment of intensifying strategic competition among major powers, multiple wars in more regions, and an increasingly fragile so-called U.S.-led “liberal international order”. It is widely recognized that Trump's own emotional, erratic, and rule-ignoring traits mean that “Trump 2.0” will bring about a more unilateralism, populism, “America First”, and a more aggressive U.S. in the international arena.
In the “Trump 2.0” period, China and the United States are likely to be in constant friction and conflict and even enter a phase of high winds and waves. If Trump wins the election, the future is bound to raise the flag of trade protectionism, re-launch the trade war, push the U.S. and China to fully decouple the economy, limit the rise of China in the field of high-tech, and the international trade system will be seriously damaged and weakened, the World Trade Organization and multilateral agreements will face new challenges. These policies will force the reorganization of the global supply chain, leading to further decoupling of the U.S. and Chinese economies, increasing market uncertainty and volatility, and thus exerting greater pressure on global economic growth.
During the first Trump administration, the U.S. constantly provoked and played with fire on the issue of Taiwan, sending many wrong signals to Taiwan’s “independence forces”. The Trump administration has gradually and substantially departed from the “one China” policy that has been adhered to by successive U.S. administrations since the normalization of U.S.-China relations, and the political foundation of U.S.-China relations has been weakened considerably as a result. The Biden administration has repeatedly declared publicly that the United States wants to return to the “one-China” policy, and its senior officials have openly stated that they do not support “Taiwan independence,” but in reality, the United States is still “hollowing out” the “one-China” policy. As Biden enters the final days of his administration, it is clear that the Biden administration hopes that the overall China-US relationship will be stable and that there will be a smooth transition to the next administration.
At the end of August this year, the U.S. and China held a round of strategic dialogue and the Taiwan question was a core concern mentioned by the Chinese side. In his meeting with Sullivan, Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointed out that Taiwan belongs to China and that China is bound to reunify. Sullivan said in the meeting that the U.S. adheres to the One China policy and does not support “Taiwan independence”, “two Chinas”, or “one China, one Taiwan”. Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointed out that “Taiwan independence” is the biggest risk to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
We need to tell the Taiwan authorities to give up the illusion of “Taiwan independence” and, at the same time, continue to engage in serious strategic dialogues with the United States, requesting the United States to live up to its commitment, stop saying one thing and doing another, stop arming “Taiwan independence”, and support the Chinese side in accomplishing the reunification by peaceful means.
总的来说，“特朗普2.0版”有可能比2017年的版本更具破坏力。与2017年首次执政相比，2024年参与第二次竞选的特朗普的观点并没有太大变化，然而他所处的美国国内形势与国际环境却发生了巨大的变化，可想而知，特朗普对如何利用总统行政权力的理解也会发生变化。与他首次执政时期相比，目前美国面临的环境是愈演愈烈的大国战略竞争、更多区域的多场战争以及日渐脆弱的所谓美国主导下的“自由国际秩序”。普遍公认的特朗普本身情绪化、反复无常、无视规则等性格特点，意味着“特朗普2.0版”将带来一个更加推崇单边主义、民粹主义、“美国优先”、在国际舞台更加咄咄逼人的美国。
在“特朗普2.0版”时期，中美很可能将会摩擦冲突不断，甚至进入风高浪急的阶段。特朗普如胜选，未来势必举起贸易保护主义大旗，重新发动贸易战，推动中美经济全面脱钩，限制中国在高科技领域的崛起，而国际贸易体系也将受到严重破坏和削弱，世界贸易组织以及多边协定将会面临新的挑战。这些政策会迫使全球供应链重组，导致中美经济的进一步脱钩，增加市场的不确定性和波动性，从而对全球的经济增长造成更大的压力。
在特朗普时期，美国在台湾问题上不断挑衅玩火，对“台独”势力发出很多错误信号。特朗普政府事实上已经逐步实质性地背离了中美关系正常化以来历届美国政府均遵守的“一个中国”政策，中美两国关系的政治基础也因之受到很大削弱。而在拜登时期，拜登政府曾多次公开宣示美国要回到“一个中国”政策，其高级官员公开表态不支持“台独”，但实际上美国仍在不断“掏空”“一个中国”政策。在拜登进入执政尾期之时，拜登政府显然希望中美关系整体是稳定的，可以顺利过渡到下一任政府。今年8月底，中美举行了新一轮的战略沟通，台湾问题是中方提及的核心关切。王毅外长在与沙利文的会晤中，指出台湾属于中国，中国必将统一。沙利文在会晤中表示，美方坚持一个中国政策，不支持“台湾独立”、不支持“两个中国”、不支援“一中一台”。王毅外长指出，“台独”是台海和平稳定的最大风险。
我们需要正告台湾当局要放弃“台独”幻想，同时面对美方，继续进行严肃的战略对话，要求美方落实自己的表态，停止表面说一套，背后做一套，终止武装“台独”动作，支持中方以和平方式完成统一。