Is Vietnam, India, or Mexico replacing China?
As China’s export and import slow, as demonstrated in the latest trade figures, the question of whether China is being replaced by other countries as the world’s top manufacturer is reverberating in various corners of the world.
A week ago, a mainstream Chinese expert penned an essay reacting to this concern. In particular, the piece examined the prospect of Vietnam, India and Mexico catching up to or potentially replacing China.
Below is a translation of the essay in full. The piece was initially published on Guancha.cn.
越南、印度、墨西哥，谁在真正挑战中国的世界工厂地位?
Vietnam, India, and Mexico, who is challenging China's status as the world's factory?
徐奇渊
中国社科院世界经济与政治研究所研究员，中国金融四十人论坛研究部主任
XU Qiyuan
Researcher, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Director, Research Department, China Forty People's Forum on Finance.
过去十多年以来，经济因素、地缘政治因素先后冲击着中国世界工厂的地位。2017及之前的十年中以经济因素变化为主，具体表现为劳动力成本上升、人民币汇率升值、用地和环境成本上升，以及部分行业产能过度膨胀。这些因素都对推动产业外迁起到了一定的作用。
Over the past decade or so, economic and geopolitical factors have successively impacted China's status as the world's factory. In the decade leading up to 2017, changes in economic factors were dominant, as evidenced by rising labor costs, appreciation of the RMB, rising land and environmental costs, and overcapacity in some industries. All of these factors have played a role in driving industrial out-migration.
2017年以来国际地缘政治格局发生了重大变化，美国的产业链政策不断进行调整。2017年特朗普政府上台后，通过重塑美国国内税收体系、推出招商引资政策来吸引产业回流，但效果并不理想。
此后美国又尝试了“近岸外包”，推动产业链向美国邻近国家（例如墨西哥）回流。不过这也难以撼动既有的全球生产分工体系。因此美国进一步转向“友岸外包”。
Since 2017, the international geopolitical landscape has undergone significant changes, and the industrial chain policy of the United States has been continuously adjusted. After Trump took office in 2017, it reshaped the U.S. domestic tax system and launched investment promotion policies to lure industries back to the United States, but the results were not ideal.
Since then, the United States has tried the " near-shoring " policy to promote the industrial chain back to neighboring countries ( such as Mexico ), but has failed to break up the established global production division of labor system. Therefore, the United States further turned to "friend-shoring".
2022年4月，美国财政部长耶伦在大西洋理事会发表讲话时说：“我们不能允许其他国家利用它们在关键商品、技术或产品方面的市场地位来扰乱我们的经济。”她进一步建议，将供应链集中在“我们可以信赖的国家”，通过这种方式降低美国的供应链风险。
In April 2022, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said in a speech to the Atlantic Council, "We cannot allow countries to use their market position in key raw materials, technologies, or products to have the power to disrupt our economy or exercise unwanted geopolitical leverage." She further suggested reducing U.S. supply chain risk by concentrating supply chains in "countries we know we can count on."
由此可见，美国重塑全球产业链的战略经历了产业回流、近岸外包、友岸外包三个阶段。这些做法不仅可能对中国的世界工厂地位造成冲击，还可能使中国在全球产业链体系中逐步陷入孤立。
It can be seen that the U.S. strategy of reshaping the global industrial chain has gone through three stages of industrial repatriation, near-shoring and friend-shoring. These practices may not only impact China's status as the world's factory, but may also gradually isolate China in the global industrial chain system.
此外，拜登政府还采取了“小院高墙”科技规锁政策以试图推动与中国的“定向脱钩”。2020年初新冠肺炎疫情全球暴发以来，日本政府也提出了“中国+1”“中国+N”的战略，欧盟也开始将供应链问题与人权、环境等问题挂钩。
In addition, the Biden administration has adopted a "small yard, high fence" technology policy in an attempt to promote "targeted decoupling" from China. Since the global outbreak of the epidemic in early 2020, the Japanese government has proposed the "China+1" and "China+N" strategy, and the EU has begun to link supply chain issues to human rights and environmental issues.
在此背景下，中国向东南亚、南亚、拉美国家转移的压力较大,尤其是处于美国近岸外包战略中的墨西哥，以及友岸外包战略中的越南和印度。
这些国家能否对中国的世界工厂地位形成真正的挑战？
In this context, the pressure of China’s industrial transfer to Southeast Asia, South Asia and Latin America is relatively high, especially Mexico in the U.S. near-shoring strategy, and Vietnam and India in the friend-shoring strategy.
Can these countries pose a real challenge to China's status as the world's factory?
墨西哥仍处于中等收入陷阱，对中国挑战最小
Mexico is still in the middle-income trap and poses the least challenge to China
墨西哥毗邻美国，且在拉美国家中经济体量排名第二，仅次于巴西。2018年中美经贸摩擦开启以来，墨西哥的发展环境似乎获得了一定改善。近年来，全面与进步跨太平洋伙伴关系协定（CPTPP）、美墨加协定（USMCA）先后生效，墨西哥与日本、美国等主要经济体的经贸关系更加紧密。再加上贸易摩擦当中美国对中国加征关税，部分贸易向墨西哥发生了转移。这些都使得墨西哥的发展获得了新的机遇。
Mexico is adjacent to the United States and has the second largest economy among Latin American countries after Brazil. Since trade frictions began to emerge between China and the United States in 2018, Mexico's development environment seems to have improved. As the CPTPP and the USMCA entered into force in recent years, Mexico's economic and trade ties with major economies such as Japan and the United States are growing closer. Coupled with trade shifting to Mexico as the result of newly imposed tariffs on Chinese goods, Mexico is enjoying new opportunities for development.
美国一直是墨西哥最重要的贸易伙伴。对美国出口占到墨西哥全部出口的八成，而且与中国对美国出口的商品结构存在明显竞争关系。在美国进口的交通运输设备、电气设备、计算机和电子产品行业进口额当中，墨西哥分别占比31%、25%、17%。由于美墨贸易联系密切，且墨西哥对美出口对于中国对美出口的替代性强，因此墨西哥似乎很可能成为贸易、投资转移的受益者。
The United States has been Mexico's most important trading partner. Exports to the United States accounted for 80% of all Mexican exports, and is in clear competition with China. Among U.S. imports of transportation equipment, electrical equipment, computers and electronics, Mexico accounted for 31%, 25%, 17%, respectively. Because of the close trade ties between the United States and Mexico, and the ability to substitute China in exporting to the United States, Mexico seems likely to become the beneficiaries of trade and investment transfer.
然而墨西哥要替代中国制造，其面临的挑战仍然巨大。墨西哥仍处于中等收入陷阱之中，面临诸多结构性问题。按2015年的美元不变价来计算，2021年墨西哥的人均国内生产总值（GDP）为9255美元，与2007年的9214美元相比几乎没有增长。
However, if Mexico wants to replace the international status of Chinese manufacturing, its challenges are still huge. Mexico is still in a middle-income trap, facing many structural challenges. In constant 2015 U.S. dollars, Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 2021 will be $9,255, almost no growth from $9,214 in 2007.
具体而言，墨西哥的商业制度对外资不够友好，基础设施方面电力和运力严重不足，特别是严重的腐败也阻碍了经济发展。
Specifically, Mexico's business system is not friendly enough to foreign investment. Economic development is also hampered by a shortage of electricity and transport capacity in terms of infrastructure and corruption.
此外，美墨加协定部分内容对墨西哥的营商环境实际上并不利。比如，美国提出了“国内产品附加值占比要求”或要求“轿车、卡车及其零件的某些生产在美国进行”，这使得墨西哥难以通过该协定吸引从中国转移出来的外资。
墨西哥并没有摆脱其固有的中等收入陷阱的发展模式，因此在中美博弈背景下墨西哥也难以发生经济奇迹。整体上，墨西哥从中美贸易摩擦中获得的贸易增长较小。
In addition, some parts of the USMCA are unfavourable to Mexico's business environment. For example, the United States proposed requirements on "the proportion of the domestic added value of the product" or requires "certain production of cars, trucks and parts thereof in the United States", which makes it difficult for Mexico to attract foreign investment transferred from China through the agreement.
The development of Mexico has not yet emerged from its inherent middle-income trap, so the Mexican economy is unlikely to see a miracle in the context of the U.S.-China trade war. Overall, Mexico has gained relatively small growth from the U.S.-China trade friction.
2021年美国彼得森经济研究所的玛丽·拉夫利（Mary Lovely）和David Xu估算，中美贸易摩擦使得墨西哥对美国的出口额多增长了3.4%。从市场份额来看，在美国对中国加征关税的行业中，墨西哥在美国的市场份额平均上升了1.6个百分点，而在未加征关税的行业，墨西哥的市场份额甚至略有下降。
In 2021, Mary Lovely and David Xu of the Peterson Institute for International Economics estimated that the value of Mexico’s imports to the United States had risen by 3.4 percent due to the China-U.S. trade war. Among goods subject to additional tariffs from Washington, Mexico's market share in the U.S. increased by an average of 1.6 percentage points. In contrast, Mexico's market share slightly fell in industries where tariffs were not added.
在投资方面，墨西哥吸引的外商直接投资（FDI）也缺乏积极变化。根据Mary Lovely和David Xu的观察，除了2020年因疫情导致FDI急剧下降之外，墨西哥的FDI在2018年至2021年也并没有出现显著增长。而且墨西哥的大部分FDI流向了以金融和保险服务为代表的第三产业，制造业投资的增长并不理想。
On the investment side, Mexico also lacks positive changes in the foreign direct investment (FDI). According to Lovely and Xu's observation, in addition to the sharp decline in FDI in 2020 due to the epidemic, Mexico's FDI did not show significant growth from 2018 to 2021. Moreover, most of Mexico's FDI flows to the tertiary sector represented by financial and insurance services, and the growth of manufacturing investment is not ideal.
观察2021年墨西哥的FDI，除了机械和运输设备制造业能与2018年持平之外，计算机制造业等主要制造业的FDI均呈现显著下降。近年来，受到疫情和美墨加协定不利条款的影响，墨西哥的投资环境并不明朗。
When observing FDI in Mexico in 2021, FDI in major manufacturing fields, such as computer manufacturing, shows a significant decline, except for machinery and transportation equipment manufacturing, which remained the same as in 2018. In recent years, the investment climate in Mexico has been affected by the epidemic and the unfavourable terms of the USMCA, which is not uncertain.
总体上，墨西哥经济增速也相当疲弱，疫情暴发前的2019年其经济增速仅为-0.2%，疫情暴发之后的经济表现也十分疲弱。2021年增速虽然达到5.7%，但是因为2020年增速为-8.3%，其经济还尚未恢复到疫情前的水平。
Mexico's economic growth rate is generally rather weak, with a growth rate of -0.2% in 2019 before the outbreak and poor economic performance after the outbreak. The GDP growth reached 5.7% in 2021, but with a growth rate of -8.3% in 2020, Mexico's economy has not yet recovered to pre-epidemic levels.
越南现实优势明显，但长期挑战有限
Vietnam’s advantages unlikely translate into long term challenge
越南最大的优势在于国内外政策环境显著改善。国内政策环境方面，越南处于重要的历史性改革进程当中，政府专注于开放、放松管制和市场化进程。在此背景下，越南通过简化法律和整肃官僚体系，创造了更好的投资环境，其对国内外投资者吸引力显著上升。
What contributes the most to Vietnam's competitiveness is the policy environment that has been significantly improved at home and abroad. Let's look at Vietnam's domestic policy environment first. The country has been amid a historic reform that focuses on opening up, deregulation and marketization. Against this backdrop, the government has been simplifying legislation and cleaning up the bureaucracy, which helps to provide a more friendly environment that attracts domestic and foreign investment.
从国际政策环境来看，2017年到2022年，越南对外开放获得重大进展，先后启动或加入了CPTPP、欧越自贸区、区域全面经济伙伴关系协定（RCEP）、印太经济框架（IPEF）。再加上越南本身就一直处于东南亚国家联盟（ASEAN），这些国际经贸合作协议就覆盖了中国、美国、欧盟、日本、东盟等几乎所有主要经济体，这为越南深度参与全球分工提供了得天独厚的政策环境。
When it comes to the international policy environment, from 2017 to 2022, Vietnam took a giant leap in opening up to the world by joining the CPTPP, the European-Vietnam FTA, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Coupled with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) where Vietnam is a member, these economic and trade agreements benefit Vietnam in a way that they converge Vietnam with almost all major economies, including China, the United States, the EU, Japan, and ASEAN together, providing such a priceless policy environment that Vietnam is deeply involved in the international division of labor.
此外，在全球价值链当中越南的地位相对印度更高。越南最主要的出口产品包括电气机械和设备、服装、鞋类以及机械设备，这些产品占到出口的6成以上，相比之下，印度的主要出口产品则是低技术制造产品，如矿物燃料、宝石等。
In addition, Vietnam holds a higher position in the global value chain than India. Above 60% of Vietnam's major exports are electrics, garments, footwear, and machinery, whereas those of India are mineral fuels and gemstones, among other low-tech manufacturing products.
但是长期来看越南对中国的挑战能力受限，最大约束条件是越南的人口和经济体量较小。越南人口不到1亿，不但小于墨西哥的1.3亿，而且也比中国、印度各自的人口少了一个数量级。越南经济腹地较为狭小，制约了其在全球生产网络中的发展空间。与此背景相关，越南工业部门不齐，偏向于轻工业为主，缺乏重化工业能力。
Taking a long-term view, however, there's a remote possibility that Vietnam might challenge China's status considering the size of its population and economy. Vietnam has a population of less than 100 million, a smaller size compared to that of Mexico whose population is estimated at 130 million, let alone that of China and India whose sizes of population reach another level. Vietnam's limited areas of economic hinterland leave a poor prospect for its growth in the global production network. In the same vein, industries in Vietnam is disproportionately distributed, with its light industrial capacity outweighing that of its heavy industry.
同时，越南严重缺乏本土的世界级企业。截至2021年，越南尚没有自己的世界500强企业，而印度有7家、中国有143家。这意味着越南在面临外资企业涌入的同时，缺乏承接外来企业的外部溢出能力。在此情况下，外资企业的大量涌入，反而可能抑制越南本土企业的成长。目前，外资企业出口在越南出口贸易中的占比一直在70%上下，而加工贸易在越南出口当中的占比则更高。
Vietnam is lagging on the number of world-class companies it has incubated. As of 2021, there are no Vietnamese business among the Fortune 500. India and China, on the other hand, has 7 and 143 respectively. This suggests that Vietnam lacks to ability to take on spillovers when foreign companies rush in the the country. Tha is to say the influx of foreign capital may actually deter growth of local businesses. At present, around 70% of Vietnam's exports trade is taken up by foreign enterprises and the proportion of processing trade in Vietnam's exports is even higher.
而且实际上在越南承接的FDI当中，有相当部分是来自中国内地，这也意味着越南与中国供应链的相互依存关系实际上是加强了。
In fact, businesses in Chinese mainland take up a significant proportion of FDI in Vietnam, meaning that supply chains in Vietnam and China is becoming more interdependent.
从笔者计算的中越双向出口竞争指数也可以看到，越南对中国的竞争压力仍然处于较低水平。其中，中国对越南出口的竞争压力指数是85.5%，越南对中国的出口竞争压力只有9.3%。
According to the two-way export competition index between China and Vietnam calculated by yours truly, Vietnam poses only limited pressure on China with its exports. The pressure index China has on Vietnam exports hit 85.5%, while only 9.3% the other way around.
也就是说，在海关HS6位码的5000多种商品分类之下，越南每出口100元的商品，中国出口的相同分类产品有85.5元；而中国每出口100元的商品，越南仅出口9.3元的同类产品，甚至这9.3元中也有部分来自于在越南的中资企业出口。
In other words, within the 5,000 categories of products defined by HS 6-digit, for every 100 yuan of goods that Vietnam exports, China exports products worth 85.5 yuan from the same category. However, for every 100 yuan of goods that China exports, Vietnam only exports only 9.3 yuan, some of which are from Chinese-owned enterprises in Vietnam.
在中越竞争中，中国处于绝对主导优势地位，无需过度担心越南的竞争压力。
中越经贸关系的互补性也十分突出。越南作为一个GDP比我国广西还小近20%的经济体，在过去21年间，中国对越南的出口从8亿美元扩张到2021年的1260亿美元，越南一跃成为中国第四大出口目的地国家，仅次于美日韩。
中国对越南的大额出口、巨大顺差本身也说明越南更像是中美之间的一个重要缓冲地带，而不是替代中国世界工厂的角色。
Therefore, in the Sino-Vietnamese economic competition, China undeniably takes a dominant position and does not need to be concerned about a Vietnamese overtake.
The complementary nature of China-Vietnam economic and trade relations has made itself clear. Vietnam, an economy with a GDP nearly 20% smaller than that of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, imported 126 billion U.S. dollars worth of good from China in 2021, compared with 800 million 21 years earlier. Vietnam is now China’s fourth largest export destination, next only to the United States, Japan and South Korea.
China's exports to Vietnam with huge surplus suggest that Vietnam is more of an important buffer zone between China and the U.S. than a substitute for China's role as the world's factory.
印度现实困难较多，但长期发展潜力大
India faces challenges but enjoys great potential in the long run
印度是唯一可以在人口规模上与中国比肩的国家，印度最大的优势也在于其经济规模庞大。虽然印度2020年人均GDP仅为1930美元，但是由于人口基数大，印度当年GDP规模为2.7万亿美元，是墨西哥的近2.5倍、越南的10倍。
The only country that can match China in terms of population size is India. Its biggest advantage also lies in size - the size of its economy. India's GDP per capita in 2020 is 1,930 dollars. Yet given its large population, its GDP in 2020 hit 2.7 trillion, nearly 2.5 times that of Mexico and 10 times that of Vietnam.
国际货币基金组织（IMF）的预测显示，以美元计价，2022年印度GDP将超越英国，成为仅次于美国、中国、日本和德国的全球第五大经济体。
According to the growth forecast by the IMF, India's GDP, in U.S. dollar terms, is going to surpass that of the United Kingdom in 2022, bringing it to the world's fifth largest economy after the United States, China, Japan and Germany.
虽然印度教育普及程度低、成人识字率（74%）明显低于世界平均水平，更加大幅低于中国、越南、墨西哥(95%以上)的水平，但是印度人口众多，因此仍然拥有充裕的廉价劳动力。
It's noticeable that India has a low participation rate in education and its adult literacy rate (74%) in India are lower than the world average and even more significantly lower than China, Vietnam and Mexico (which is above 95%). However, India has a large population which offers abundant low cost labor.
另外，印度政府也意识到了庞大经济体量的优势，正在行政、税收等方面努力推动形成国内统一大市场。2021年，在疫情的巨大冲击下，印度仍然实现了8.1%的增速，GDP规模进一步扩张，超过了3万亿美元，人均水平接近2300美元。在2021年的基础上，2022年上半年印度经济增速进一步提升到了8.4%。
In addition, the Indian government is taking advantage of its large economy and is putting into work on administration and taxation's side to create a large, unified market at home. In 2021, despite the tremendous impact of the pandemic, India still achieved a growth rate of 8.1%, with further expansion of GDP to over 3 trillion dollars and per capita GDP to nearly 2,300 dollars. Building on what India has achieved in 2021, its economic growth in 2022 increased to 8.4% in the first half.
庞大的人口和市场体量，还支撑了印度拥有较强的研发能力和世界级企业。根据英国《泰晤士报》的2021年世界大学排名，印度位居前1200名的大学有56所，距离中国的92所有一定差距。但是相比之下，越南、墨西哥各自只有3所，而且这两个国家在前1200名大学中的排名都比较靠后。相对而言，印度的科技和创新能力不容小觑。
India's large population and market size gave sturdy foundation to India’s strong R&D capabilities and world-class companies. According to World University Rankings 2021 by Times Higher Education, there are 56 Indian universities among the top 1200, falling short of China’s 92 but vastly outnumber Vietnam and Mexico, which each has three. India's technology and innovation capabilities should never be underestimated.
此外，2022年印度已经有世界500强企业9家，而且其信息技术产业发展成熟、精英阶层在海外分布广泛、英语语言优势明显，因此印度本土企业、海外精英与美国私营企业深度融合。美国几乎所有行业的信息技术（IT）服务都在不同程度上依赖印度企业。而且印度的经济自给能力强，对中国中间品供应依赖程度低，更有条件形成与中国相隔离的供应链。
In addition, as of 2022, there're nine Fortune 500 companies in India. The country's mature IT industry, worldwide elite population and labor's language proficiency all give rise to a deep integration of local Indian companies, overseas elites, and private businesses in the United States. The United States relies on Indian companies to varying degrees for information technology (IT) services in almost all industries. Moreover, India's self-sufficient economy and its low dependence on Chinese intermediate goods supply make it better positioned to form a supply chain separated from China.
但是印度也有其明显的短板，最大问题在于印度的宗教和文化因素。印度出世的宗教信仰让国民内心比较恬淡、发展经济的欲望不强烈，此外种姓制度带来的阶层固化也对发展经济形成了障碍。相比之下，越南则属于东亚的儒家文化圈, 有着比较强的入世取向, 会有相对较强的发展欲望。同时，印度行政效率低、基础设施发展严重滞后，要改变这些发展条件也并不容易。
But India’s religious and cultural factors also limit its development. India’s transcendental religious beliefs have left the people with a low desire for economic development. In contrast, Vietnamese are more influenced by Confucianism, and are willing to devote themselves to society, so they have a relatively stronger desire for development. In addition, India’s caste system, administrative inefficiency and lagging infrastructure development have also created obstacles to India’s economic development.
从空间上来看，当今世界的三大生产网络包括欧洲、北美、东亚，而印度远离其中任何一极。虽然印度与东亚生产网络稍近，但与东亚核心区域的国家相比，印度的交通运输成本也显著偏高。中国之外的周边邻国，也难以对印度的生产体系形成有力支撑，印度要一枝独秀支撑起世界第四大生产网络恐怕难度较大。
In terms of location, the three major production networks in the world today are Europe, North America, and East Asia, and India is far from any of them. Although India is slightly closer to the East Asian production network, India’s transportation costs are also significantly higher compared to the countries in the East Asian region. India’s neighbors, other than China, can hardly offer strong support for India’s production system. I am afraid it is difficult for India to support the world’s fourth-largest production network alone.
同时当前的莫迪政府过于强调国内循环，缺乏对外开放的决心和实际行动。2020年莫迪政府提出了“自给印度”倡议，希望把本土市场做大做强。但其实际上采取的是进口替代战略，这意味着提高进口关税，补贴国内相对落后的生产方式。而进口替代已经被拉美国家证明是一种失败的发展战略，东亚国家的崛起普遍采取的是出口导向战略，鼓励本土企业参与国际竞争，不断提高国际竞争力。
Moreover, the Modi government over emphasizes on domestic cycle and lacks the determination and action to open up to the outside world. Modi’s call in 2020 for an Atmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India) hopes to make the local market bigger and stronger. But it is actually adopting an import substitution strategy, which means raising import tariffs and subsidizing relatively backward domestic production. Yet import substitution has been proven to be a failure by Latin American countries. The rise of East Asian countries has generally adopted an export-oriented strategy to encourage local enterprises to participate in international competition and continuously improve their international competitiveness.
2020年世界经济论坛World Economic Forum（WEF）发布的全球竞争力报告Global Competitiveness Report 2020对19个主要经济体价值链的全球化发展趋势进行了问卷调查，全球商业领袖对于印度价值链的全球化发展趋势评价负面，印度在19个国家中排位倒数第一。
The Global Competitiveness Report 2020, published by the World Economic Forum (WEF), conducted a questionnaire survey on the globalization trends of value chains in 19 major economies. The survey shows that global business leaders have a negative perception of the globalization trends in India's value chains, with India ranking at the bottom of the list of 19 countries.
总体上，印度要实现真正的崛起，需要对其宗教、文化进行深刻革命，并且在此基础上进行一轮颠覆性的改革开放。但是印度旧有的宗教文化使其社会能够保持相对稳定，如果原有的宗教文化体系被打破，印度社会如何重建一套自我稳定的逻辑体系，这可能是更具有挑战性的问题。
In general, India’s true emergence requires a round of reform and opening up. However, India’s current religion and culture enable its society to remain relatively stable. If the original religious and cultural system is broken, it may be more challenging for Indian society to rebuild a self-stabilizing system.
中国需要继续深化改革开放，做好自己的事情仍然是最重要的着眼点
China’s task ahead
首先，做好自己的事情仍然是最重要的政策着眼点。任何国家能否在全球供应链当中维持自己的核心地位，主要不是靠打压竞争对手做到的，而是靠做好自己的事情、增强自己的产业竞争力。
同样，中国要应对产业链外移的压力，从积极应对的角度来说就需要继续做好自己、不断实现产业升级、推动产业竞争力的提升。
所以，我国一定要保持开放包容的心态，加强国际合作，进一步改善营商环境，通过扩大内需战略为产业升级提升良好的宏观经济环境。
First, China’s policy should focus on its own development. The core position of a country in the global supply chain is not achieved by suppressing competitors, but by enhancing its own industrial competitiveness.
As for China, to cope with the pressure of industrial chain migration, it is necessary to continuously achieve industrial upgrading and promote industrial competitiveness.
Therefore, China should remain open and inclusive, strengthen international cooperation, further improve the business environment, and promote a favorable macroeconomic environment for industrial upgrading by expanding domestic demand.
其次，从国际角度来看，中国需要继续坚持对外开放的基本国策。
再次，要顺势而为，加强与越南等中间缓冲地带国家的经贸联系。推动我国和这些国家形成广泛的经贸合作，推动越南经济融入我国的生产网络，使我国企业能够更多分享越南发展红利。
我国企业可以积极投资布局，在越南推动形成包括中资企业在内、外资企业发挥重要影响力的经济格局。同时推动发展“西部大通道”，尤其是广西段出海口，将其发展成为与我国珠三角、越南形成良性互动的新区域产业链集群，充分利用好越南作为中美之间经济缓冲地带的作用。
Second, from an international perspective, China should continue to adhere to the basic state policy of opening up.
Third, China should take advantage of the trend, strengthen economic and trade ties with Vietnam and other “buffer zone” countries, and promote Vietnam’s economic integration into China’s production network.
Chinese enterprises can actively invest in Vietnam so that Chinese enterprises and other foreign enterprises both play an important role. At the same time, China should promote the “New Western Land-sea Corridor” project, especially the ports in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, to develop it into a new regional industrial chain cluster on par with the Pearl River Delta and Vietnam.
最后，要巩固中国在全球生产网络中的地位，要进一步深化东亚区域的产业链合作。欧洲、北美、东亚是全球三大区域生产网络，在一定程度上而言，东亚区域生产网络的深化发展、相互依赖程度的加深，也将与中国的世界工厂地位形成良性互动。
事实上，印度放弃成为RCEP创始成员国，实际上也是放弃了深度参与东亚区域生产网络的机会。我们要吸取印度的教训，在东亚地区积极推动产业链和供应链合作，进一步提升东亚地区的经贸合作水平。同时，积极向更高标准的国际经贸规则看齐，通过对标更高标准的规则来倒逼国内经济体制进一步深化改革与开放。
Finally, further deepening industrial chain cooperation in East Asia is necessary to consolidate China's position in the global production network. Europe, North America and East Asia are the world’s three major regional production networks. To a certain extent, East Asia's deepening development and interdependence are conducive to China’s position as the world’s factory.
By giving up RCEP membership as a founding member, India is also giving up the opportunity to become deeply involved in East Asia’s regional production network. China should draw lessons from India and promote industrial and supply chain cooperation in East Asia. At the same time, China should keep up with the higher standards of international economic and trade rules and force the domestic financial system to further deepen the reform and opening up through the higher standards.
Lu Jia’nan, Liu Lin and Sun Mengqi contributed to the interpretation.
Views expressed in this essay belong to the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of this newsletter.