Signalling over Taiwan: are Beijing and DC getting each other right?
A Chinese think tank report examines how Beijing and DC are perceiving each other
Earlier this month, the Chinese think tank Shanghai Institute for International Studies, in conjunction with the U.S. Institute of Peace, conducted a study on how Beijing and Washington are reading each other’s signals, particularly surrounding the Taiwan question.
Both sides summarized a chain of events concerning interaction over Taiwan and presented them during more than a dozen interviews with policymakers and analysts.
Unsurprisingly, the study found that each country’s interviewees have a drastically different view of the interaction between Beijing and Washington over Taiwan.
When the consequences of misperception and miscalculation are as dire as ever, the report offers a sketch of where each side stands on things and interprets signals from the other side.
This newsletter will offer a partial translation of the SIIS report and comments by a panel of Chinese experts discussing its findings.
【1】The report
▲Key Findings:
• Interviews with policymakers and analysts in China and the United States regarding the signalling by both sides during the first ten weeks of the Biden administration reveal a wide gap between each side’s perceptions and interpretations of events.
• Washington and Beijing frequently have different understandings of each other’s foreign policy signals, a problem that has become increasingly challenging in recent years.
• Such a situation contributes to a bilateral action-reaction dynamic that can intensify into an action-reaction cycle and escalation spiral. Ultimately, misreading signals within the broader context of a tense bilateral relationship can create significant potential for unintended escalation and unwanted conflict.
• While policymakers on both sides recognize that many signals are not tit-for-tat responses, there is often confusion about what they signify.
• To promote a stable and predictable relationship, Beijing and Washington should maintain multiple lines of communication. Regular in-depth dialogues on the Taiwan question should be conducted to reduce the risk of conflict.
▲In interviewing Chinese policymakers and analysts, SIIS found that
1. Most Chinese interviewees said they changed their opinion of Biden’s Taiwan policy in his first ten weeks. There was a level of optimism when Biden came into office, but that optimism had largely dispersed by the end of March 2021.
2. Most Chinese interviewees said they attach very high importance to speeches and readouts of foreign affairs officials of both China and the United States, as they believe these are essential policy signals each side wishes to send.
3. Most Chinese interviewees said they pay close attention to any new formulations in U.S. policy papers, especially concerning Taiwan. They believe these would be essential policy signals.
4. The Chinese interviewees are watching closely Taiwan-related legislation in the U.S. Congress.
5. Chinese interviewees believe that other aspects of Biden’s China policy, such as human rights, Hong Kong, and BRI, deepened the mistrust between Beijing and Washington. The interviewees see the abovementioned policies as interconnected with Biden’s Taiwan policies and integral to an overall scheme to contain China. This strengthened the belief in Beijing that the fundamental nature of Biden’s Taiwan policy is but a tool to contain China.
6. Most Chinese interviewees say though the timing of some actions from the two sides is close to one another, they may not be a direct response to the other party. Some activities are routine execution of policy and should not be over-read.
7. Chinese interviewees believe that military actions taken by the mainland in the Taiwan region send out a strong signal against Taiwan’s independence forces and show that Beijing is giving more thought to a military approach to the Taiwan question and is hardening its bottom line.
8. Chinese interviewees are paying close attention to U.S. efforts to draw third parties in to speak up on Taiwan. They think this amounts to an “internationalization “of the Taiwan question.
9. Chinese interviewees think that the signals both sides are sending over Taiwan have implications beyond Taiwan. They are strategic probing by the two sides.
10. Chinese interviewees think video or phone conversations between the two countries’ leaders are crucial. They can help prevent strategic miscalculation and are beneficial to maintaining stability in the Taiwan region.
▲Findings by the USIP in interviewing U.S. analysts.
1. Most think there’s insufficient evidence of an action-reaction cycle between Beijing and Washington.
2. Many did not draw lines between some actions by Beijing to the Sino-U.S. relationship. Some interviewees said that if some of Beijing's moves were intended to send signals to the United States, they were not picked up by Washington. There are also actions by Beijing that were perceived as signals but conveyed unclear messages.
3. While admitting that Washington may have failed to pick up some of China’s signals, the interviewees suggest that China may have misread some of Washington’s actions, drawn connections between unrelated events, or saw signals that weren’t there.
4. The interviewees said the “action-reaction“ mode might apply to other aspects of the Sino-U.S. relationship but not to the Taiwan question, as Washington manages its relationship with Taipei independently of its ties with Beijing.
▲SIIS analysis based on the findings.
1. Experts from both countries agree that events do not closely follow an “action-reaction “pattern. In the meantime, both sides have many confusions over the signals from the other side. Specifically, the other side has different interpretations of a particular action.
2. Experts from both countries have drastically different views of concerted actions between Washington and third parties.
3. It seems unavoidable for U.S. administrations to send out chaotic signals in their first days.
4. U.S. policies on Taiwan, especially the extreme policies revealed in the final days of the Trump administration, heavily influenced how China understands and judges policies and signals from the Biden administration.
5. By including its allies in countering the China challenge, the Biden administration’s Taiwan policy is being viewed more negatively by Chinese experts.
6. Both sides differ significantly in interpreting signals from the other side. Political infighting between the Democratic and Republic Parties and the rise of social media has complicated the sending and receiving process for policy signals.
▲USIP analysis based on the findings.
1. Experts in both countries warn of over-interpreting signals from the other side and agree that specific actions should not be viewed as reacting to an earlier event.
2. Chinese experts believe the Biden administration strengthened its official connection to Taipei and is moving toward supporting Taiwan’s independence. U.S. experts argue that U.S. policies on Taiwan are consistent.
3. Both sides have different views on Beijing’s military exercises. Some Chinese experts believe Washington correctly understood the signal Beijing was trying to send with military exercises, while others say Washington may have misunderstood the signals. U.S. experts have concluded that by having military exercises, China is putting pressure on Taiwan.
4. The two sides read each other differ significantly. And that difference has made an impact on actions taken by the two sides.
5. Different assessments of motivating factors behind the other side’s actions may trigger conflict and increase the chances of crisis.
6. Misreading and miscalculation may prevent effective dialogue.
▲SIIS recommendations:
1. Maintaining dialogue is crucial to keep bilateral ties stable and predictable.
2. To avoid risks of conflict between China and the United States over Taiwan, both sides should hold periodic dialogues on various levels.
3. Both sides should be fully aware of the sway of public opinion on policy-making on the two sides, especially the impact of social media on policy making.
▲USIP recommendations:
1. Both sides should maintain a multi-layered dialogue mechanism.
2. Both sides should designate particular officials or channels to convey authoritative messages.
【2】 Discussions
信强 复旦大学台湾研究中心主任
XIN Qiang, Director, Center for Taiwan Studies, Fudan University
针对中美围绕台湾问题的信号释放提出了三点看法。第一，信号源问题。虽然美国国会在三权分立的体制下拥有一定的外交决策权，但是传统上外交政策的制定主要掌握在行政部门手中。然而，近年来美国相对一元性的外交政策信号源正在慢慢地向二元甚至多元性演变，尤其是在对华和涉台决策领域，我行我素的国会发挥了越来越具有破坏性的作用，这导致美方很多政策信号相互抵触，前后矛盾。第二，信号权威度问题。中美双方对于信号的权威性与可信度存在很大分歧，甚至对于哪些是应该予以严肃对待的政策信号也看法不一，意味着双方在解读彼此政策的时候极有可能出现重大误差，由此导致安全和外交政策出现始料未及的变化。第三，信号解读能力。能否准确解读对方的政策信号直接影响到外交决策的质量，以及随之产生的政策后果。此次佩洛西不顾中国发出的严正警告依然执意窜访台湾，而拜登政府也并没有努力予以劝阻和反对，由此表明美方并未对中方的政策信号做出正确的解读，从而导致中美关系遭到严重破坏，便可谓是一个明显的反面例证。
I’d like to make three points regarding the signaling between China and the United States around the Taiwan question. First, the source. Although foreign policy-making power can be partly shared by the U.S. Congress according to the separation of powers, tradtionaly it is mainly in the hands of the executive branch. However, in recent years, the relatively monolithic U.S. foreign policy signal sources are slowly evolving into duality or even pluralism. Particularly in the areas of China including Taiwan-related policy-making, where the my-way-or-the-highway Congress has played an increasingly destructive role, leading to many conflicting and inconsistent U.S. policy signals. Second, the authority of the signals. China and the United States may have different evaluations for each signal’s authority and credibility, and they even have different views on which policy signals should be taken seriously, which means there is a high risk of significant errors in the interpretation of each other's policies, leading to unanticipated changes in security and foreign policy. Third, the ability to interpret signals. The ability to accurately interpret the other side's policy signals directly affects the quality of foreign policy decisions and the ensuing policy consequences. Pelosi's insistence on visiting Taiwan despite China's stern warnings and the Biden administration's lack of effort to dissuade her from doing so are clear examples of how the U.S. side has not interpreted China's policy signals correctly, leading to serious damage to U.S.-China relations.
汪曙申 中国社会科学院台湾研究所台美关系室主任
WANG Shushen, Director, Taiwan-U.S. Relations, Institute of Taiwan Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
美国政府虽然一直声称坚持一个中国政策，但其内涵已不同以往。从美国角度而言，过去坚持一个中国政策，意味着美国不支持“台独”，不与台湾发展和提升官方关系。然而近年美国在上述层面的表述发生了调整，现在更多地凸显中美两国关于一中政策的差异性，用这种差异性去排除、掩盖甚至压制共同性。在当前台海局势的复杂局面下，中美双方自然会发出各种战略和政策信号，重要信号能否被及时捕捉，被准确地理解，并反映在政策上执行，就显得非常重要。
Although the U.S. government has always claimed to adhere to the One-China policy, its connotations are different. From the U.S. perspective, adherence to the One-China policy used to mean that the United States did not support "Taiwan independence" and did not develop or enhance official relations with Taiwan. In recent years, however, the U.S. has adjusted its statements, now highlighting more of the differences between the U.S. and China regarding the One-China policy in order to exclude, obscure, or even suppress commonalities. With such complex situation in the Taiwan Strait, it is natural for China and the United States to send out various strategic and policy signals, and it is important that key signals are captured in a timely manner, accurately understood, and reflected in policy implementation.
夏立平 同济大学政治与国际关系学院教授
Xia Liping, Professor, School of Politics and International Relations, Tongji University
中美在台湾问题上存在着的四大障碍。第一个障碍是美国国会中的鹰派反华议员，不论是共和党议员还是民主党议员，都想要掏空甚至抛弃“一个中国”原则。第二个障碍是拜登政府在应对美国国会反华举措时的软弱无力，其无法阻止佩洛西访台，也难以阻止“台湾政策法”通过。第三个障碍是台湾当局企图依靠美国谋取“台独”。第四个障碍则是新冠疫情使得中美专家学者几乎难以面对面的线下交流，这在一定程度上严重损害了双方的相互了解和相互信任。
There are four major obstacles to the U.S.-China relationship on Taiwan. The first is the hawkish anti-China members of the U.S. Congress, both Republican and Democrat, who want to hollow out or even abandon the One-China policy. The second is the Biden administration's weakness in responding to anti-China initiatives in the U.S. Congress, its inability to prevent Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, and its difficulty in preventing the passing of the Taiwan Policy Act. The third is the Taiwanese authorities’ attempt to rely on the United States for “Taiwan independence”. The fourth is that the epidemic has made it difficult for experts and scholars from China and the U.S. to communicate face-to-face offline, which has to some extent seriously undermined mutual understanding and trust between the two sides.
袁征 中国社会科学院美国研究所副所长
YUAN Zheng, Deputy Director of Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)
中美两国关系注定要经历一个动荡不定的时刻，在未来的五年到十年里其挑战大于机遇。应采取行动避免两国正面碰撞。美方必须停止侵害中国主权，以实际行动遵守其在台湾问题上的承诺。而在这样的原则性问题上，中方无法也不会退让。若双方难以达成妥协，中美关系发生实质性改善的前景只会更加黯淡。
The relationship between China and the United States is bound to go through a turbulent period, with more challenges than opportunities in the next five to ten years. Head-on collisions should be avoided. The U.S. side must stop infringing on China’s sovereignty and honor its commitment on the Taiwan question with concrete actions. China cannot and will not budge on such a matter of principle. Without a compromise, prospects for a substantial improvement in China-U.S. relations will only be dimmer.
王健 上海社会科学院国际问题研究所所长
WANG Jian, Director of Institute of International Relations, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS)
回顾中美关系的历史，善意的信号和积极的意愿有助于双方认识、正确判断对方战略意图，也有助于危机和分歧的处理。要想正确传递积极信号，形成有利于两国关系的良性信号反馈和行为互动，有两点非常重要。一是双方主要领导人要高瞻远瞩，有历史使命感和政治担当，把握正确的历史方向。二是双方传递信号不仅要看言语，更要看行动。
A review of the history of China-U.S. relations shows that positive signals of goodwill will not only help both sides understand each other’s strategic intentions, but also help them manage crises and differences. In order to send out positive signals correctly and form positive interaction, the following two points are important:
First, the leaders of China and the U.S. should be forward-looking, have a sense of historical mission and political responsibility, and keep to the right historical direction.
Second, both sides should send signals not only through words, but also through actions.
郭拥军 中国现代国际关系研究院涉台事务研究中心执行主任
GUO Yongjun, Executive Director of Center for Taiwan-related Affairs Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)
总体来看，中国政府的对台政策稳定、延续、可预期，美国、台湾地区的相关政策变动较大、是台海危机的始作俑者。未来，如果中美关系依然受到来自美国、台湾地区的较多负面因素驱动，那么台海危机 或将持续更长时间。在与美国方面的交流中，中国可加强对于香港问题和“一国两制”方针的阐释与说明；而美国战略界人士若想更加充分全面地了解中国的对台政策，也应当对香港问题和“一国两制”的实践进行客观实际的了解。
On the whole, China’s policy towards Taiwan is stable, consistent and predictable, while the U.S. and Taiwan region have made great policy changes which are the initiators of the Taiwan Straits crisis. In the future, if China-U.S. relations continue to be driven by negative factors from the U.S. and Taiwan region, the crisis may last longer. In exchanges with the United States, China can further explain its policy on Hong Kong and the principle of “one country, two systems”. The U.S. strategic community should also have an objective understanding of these two points, in order to fully understand China’s Taiwan policy.
邵育群 上海国际问题研究院台港澳研究所所长
SHAO Yuqun, Director, Institute for Taiwan, Hong Kong & Macau Studies, SIIS
美国国内制度性衰败已经并将继续对美国对华政策产生危险的影响，美国行政当局与国会的互相制衡反而将美国对外政策推向极端。虽然行政当局明知佩洛西此行既不符合美国战略利益，也将严重冲击中美关系，但囿于制度设计中所谓国会有权独立行动，以及害怕被共和党批为“对华软弱”而在政党政治中失分，因而不愿尽力阻止，眼看着美国台海政策被个别政客带向极端。
The institutional decline in the United States has had and will continue to pose a threat on U.S. policy toward China. The checks and balances between the U.S. executive branch and Congress have instead pushed U.S. foreign policy to an extreme. Although the administration knows that Pelosi's visit does not serve the strategic interests of the United States but will damage Sino-American relations, it is reluctant to make any effort to stop her actions, letting the U.S. Taiwan Strait policy being taken to extremes by individual politicians. This has to do with the U.S. institutional structure under which the so-called Congress's right to act independently, as well as the Congress's fear of being criticized by the Republican Party for being "soft on China" thus losing points in party politics.
吴莼思 上海国际问题研究院国际战略研究所所长
WU CHUNSI Director, Institute for International Strategic Studies, SIIS
对于拜登政府当前到底是不能准确接收中方的政策信号，还是根本就是不愿意接收中方政策信号，不同学者在不同场景下也许有不同的理解。但就佩洛西访台这件事而言，中方的信息传递是清晰的、明确的、强烈的，但美方仍然执意要挑战中方的核心国家利益。
Scholars may come to different conclusions on whether the Biden administration can accurately receive signals from Beijing, or whether it has the intention of receiving signals from Beijing at all. But on Pelosi’s Taiwan visit, China has been sending clear and strong messages, but the U.S. insisted on challenging China's core national interests.
童立群 上海国际问题研究院台港澳研究所副研究员
TONG Liqun Vice Fellow, Institute for Taiwan, Hong Kong & Macau Studies, SIIS
大部分亚太国家对“第四次台海危机”的反应可以概括为三个方面。第一，大部分亚太国家都支持并强调一个中国的政策。第二，可以从这些国家的声明中读出，他们不愿意在中美之间选边站。第三，东盟或者是整个亚太国家都希望在这个地区保持平衡的状态，包括美国的盟国在内，他们最大的这个诉求是整个地区的和平与稳定。
Most Asia-Pacific countries' responses to the "fourth Taiwan Strait crisis" are of the following three characteristics: first, they support and stress the one-China policy; second, it can be read from their statements that the last thing they want is to take sides between the two super powers; third, ASEAN or the Asia-Pacific countries want to keep a balance of power in the region, where the U.S. allies are included. Peace and stability of the region are the greatest demand of those countries.
于运全 当代中国与世界研究院院长
YU Yunquan, Director, Academy of Contemporary China and World Studies
中美关系在未来两三年内依然存在回暖的窗口期，而这需要两国智库、研究机构和媒体等各届专业人士加强战略沟通，清晰准确稳定地传递双方的权威政策信号，负责任地向政府和公众做出阐释，避免不必要的误读与误判。
There is still a window period in the next two to three years for Sino-American relations to recover. This requires think tanks, research institutions and media of the both sides to strengthen strategic communication and to regularly transmit policy signals that are authoritative, clear and accurate. What's also required is credible explanationas provided for the public and the government to avoid unnecessary misinterpretation and misjudgment.
Sun Mengqi, Liu Lin and Lu Jianan contributed to this newsletter.