The Xi-Biden meeting, assessed by Chinese experts
Hello guys
It’s been more than 10 days since the leaders of China and the United States chatted via video link on a host of terribly important issues, and because of the difficulty to hold across-the-border academic discussions, your host thought it might be helpful to compile the takes of mainstream Chinese experts on the meeting.
Zhu Feng, Acting Director, School of International Relations, Nanjing University
While Zhu applauds the meeting, he describes the Sino-U.S. relationship as that of one between a rising power and a dominant power. He says “It is unrealistic to expect fundamental changes in U.S.-China relations through just one head of state meeting. "
It is unrealistic to expect fundamental changes in U.S.-China relations through just one head of state meeting. The U.S.-China relationship has become the most systemically transformative relationship between a "dominant power" and a "rising power" in the history of the world and is the most important and complex bilateral relationship for world peace, stability, and prosperity. But the key test is whether China and the U.S. can truly "walk in the same direction".
It remains a major test for both governments to implement the consensus of the heads of state meeting and to start transactional consultations in relevant areas as soon as possible, so that China-US cooperation and disagreement management can be discussed and carried on, and that the talks can produce results and a more promising and brighter future.
仅仅通过一次元首会谈，奢望让中美关系发生根本性变化是不现实的。中美关系已经成为世界历史上最有体系变革意义的“主导型大国”和“崛起型大国”之间的关系，是关系到世界和平、稳定与繁荣最重要、且最复杂的双边关系。但关键的考验是中美能否真正地“相向而行”。
未来两国政府如何落实元首会晤共识、尽快启动相关领域的事务性磋商，让中美合作和分歧管控得以谈起来、谈下去，谈出成果、谈出更有希望和光明的未来，仍然是两国政府面临的重大考验。
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Wang Fan, Vice President, China Foreign Affairs University
外交学院教授王帆
Wang was willing to entertain the idea that should mutual cooperation benefits the two sides unevenly, there could be discussions to solve the issue, but stresses that both sides should still adhere to the win-win principle.
Historically, the U.S.-China relationship has indeed been a win-win. If the benefits of win-win are not equal, both sides can carry out discussions but must adhere to the principle of win-win, because only win-win can achieve mutual profit for both sides. To aim to be the single winner will produce no winners. Although differences cannot be completely eliminated, both sides need to reduce costly misunderstandings.
从历史上看，中美关系确实是共赢的。如果共赢的收益不对等，双方可以探讨，但必须坚持共赢原则，因为只有共赢才能实现双方共同获利，只想单赢那就没有赢家。虽然差异无法完全消除，但双方需要减少可能产生高昂代价的误解。
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Da Wei, Deputy Director, Strategic and Security Research Center, Tsinghua University
清华大学战略与安全研究中心副主任、清华大学社会科学学院国际关系学系教授达巍
Da addresses the U.S. tactic of rallying its allies against China, saying there could possibly be achievements by Washington on this front, and China needs to watch its step.
The comment is remarkable in that it hints at the risks of deteriorating relationships between China and countries such as Australia. If China wants to focus its competition with the United States, antagonizing others doesn’t help.
At present, the U.S. alliance strategy has indeed undergone a major shift, that is, the military-based alliance system formed during the Cold War is gradually becoming a more comprehensive (including economic and social issues) yet looser alliance system. In this system, many of what the U.S. considers "allies" may not be treaty allies in the usual sense, such as India. The success of the U.S. alliance strategy also needs to be measured by specific criteria. If the U.S. tries to mobilize these countries to confront China and create a bloc that excludes China, it will be difficult because these countries have share interests with China; if the U.S. tries to increase cooperation with these countries on issues invloving China, and in the process of which obtaining additional options and insurances, it is possible to make greater progress.
At this stage of U.S. policy, China needs to pay attention to the relationship with the "intermediate countries" between China and the U.S., such as South Korea and Australia, because these countries have a very close relationship with China and do not want to choose sides between China and the U.S. If the U.S. forces these countries to choose sides now, it will be difficult for the U.S. to succeed. China also needs to be careful not to push these countries to the side of the US. Therefore, China should try to seek friendly cooperation with these countries.
目前，美国的盟友战略确实发生了比较大的转变，即美国在冷战期间形成的以军事同盟为基础的紧凑的盟友体系，正在逐渐变成综合性（包括经济、社会等议题的）更加松散一些的盟友体系。在这个体系中，许多美国认为的“盟友”认为或许并不是一般意义上的条约盟”，比如印度。美国盟友策略的成功与否，也需要看具体衡量标准。如果美国试图动员这些国家来对抗中国，建立一个将中国排除在外的集团，那么这个目标很难成功，因为这些国家与中国有密切的利益关联；如果美国试图与这些国家围绕中国增加一些合作，通过与这些国家的合作使美国多一种选择与保险，这个则是有可能取得较大进展的。
针对美国现阶段的政策，中国需要重视与中美之间的“中间国家”的关系，比如韩国、澳大利亚等，因为这些国家与中国有很密切大关系，并不希望在中美之间选边站队，如果现在美国逼迫这些国家选边站队，美国很难成功。中国也需要注意不要把这些国家推到美国身边。因此，中国应该尽量争取与这些国家的友好合作。
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Wu Xinbo, Director, U.S. Studies Center, Fudan University
Wu says the U.S. came to the meeting seeking guardrails but ironically demolished any existing guardrails on Taiwan by putting an emphasis on the TRA and six assurances.
There were once "guardrails," such as the three joint communiqués. But now the United States is increasingly marginalizing the three joint communiqués, taking out the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances to weaken the three joint communiqués. The other day, when Blinken talked about his policy toward Taiwan, he did not even mention the three joint communiqués, saying that the U.S. one-China policy is based on the Taiwan Relations Act.
In this way, the most important "guardrail" on the Taiwan issue is gone, and that is very dangerous.
曾经有“护栏”，比如说三个联合公报就是“护栏”。但现在美国越来越把三个联合公报边缘化，把《台湾关系法》和六项保证拿出来弱化三个联合公报。前几天布林肯在讲到对台政策的时候，甚至连三个联合公报都不提了，就是说美国的一个中国政策是基于《台湾关系法》的。
这样一来，在台湾问题上最重要的“护栏”就没有了，那就很危险了。
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Wang Huiyao, Director, Center for China and Globalization
Wang suggests that China, the United States, and Europe join hands in carving up the global infrastructure construction industry, which would of course achieve a win-win-win situation.
In the coming decades, trillions of dollars of infrastructure construction will be a huge "cake" for global economic development. In the face of huge capital and construction gap, China, the United States and Europe do not have sufficient financing and construction capacity, and compared with traditional infrastructure, the "new infrastructure" projects are more in the field of information technology and technological innovation, which means that the demand of market players, especially high-tech enterprises, will be higher. Therefore, financing the "new infrastructure" projects must rely on a diversified financing system, mobilizing private investment, and innovating financing methods. China, the United States and Europe have different advantages in terms of capital, technology, human resources, management experience and regulatory system in different fields, so China, the United States and Europe can strengthen the docking cooperation of infrastructure projects in the suitable fields instead of competing with each other.
未来几十年，上百万亿基础设施建设将是全球经济发展一块巨大的“蛋糕”。面对巨大的资金及建设缺口，中国、美国及欧洲等单方面都不具备足够的融资及承建能力，而且与传统基建相比，“新基建”项目更偏信息化和科技创新领域，意味着市场主体特别是高新技术企业的参与度会比较高。因此，“新基建”项目的融资必须依靠多元化的融资体系，调动民间投资积极性，并在融资方式上有所创新。中美欧在不同领域资金、技术、人才、管理经验、法规制度等方面存在不同优势，中美欧可在契合领域加强基建计划对接合作而不是相互敌视竞争。
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Zhao Minghao, Senior Fellow, The Charhar Institute
Zhao calls out the dangerous moves by Washington on Taiwan, saying Taiwan is the next card up Washington’s sleeve after the trade war was proven ineffective. He says “The Biden administration has seemingly approached to the verge of strategic ambiguity“
The Taiwan issue was the focus of discussion at the Sino-U.S. leader meeting, and it is the most sensitive factor that could trigger a war between China and the United States. Some on the U.S. side have been speculating that the mainland will take military action against Taiwan by 2027, and see the ability to "defend Taiwan" as the "cutting edge" of the U.S.-China strategic battle. This has given the Chinese side the impression that, having failed to win the "trade war" with China, the U.S. has begun to play the "Taiwan card" more maliciously, even trying to completely interrupt China's peaceful rise through a war. The Biden administration seems to be on the verge of changing its "strategic ambiguity" on the Taiwan issue.
台湾问题是这次中美元首会晤重点讨论的议题，它是有可能引爆中美战争的最敏感因素。美方一些人士一直在炒作大陆将在2027年之前对台湾采取军事行动，并将能否“保卫台湾”视为中美战略较量的“最前沿”。这让中国方面感到，在未能赢得对华“贸易战”的情况下，美国开始更加恶意地玩弄“台湾牌”，甚至妄图通过一场战争彻底打断中国和平崛起的进程。在台湾问题上，拜登政府似乎已经走到改变“战略模糊”的边缘。
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Wang Honggang Director, U.S. Studies Center, China Institute of Contemporary International Studies
Wang stresses China’s seriousness on the Taiwan issue and expresses the view that China believes the U.S. is gradually departing from the three communiques, thus weakening the foundation of the China-U.S. relationship. Wang outlines some of the features of future China-U.S. interaction over Taiwan.
China has repeatedly clarified its serious position on the Taiwan issue to the U.S. side to make it clear that if the U.S. side continues to play the "Taiwan card" and continues to manipulate the "new two-sided approach" or even the "new ambiguous policy," then the U.S. side will not be successful in seeking for “competition management“ with China. "The situation in the Taiwan Strait is likely to become a new strategic burden for the United States, and the United States may once again make a major strategic mistake in its foreign strategy.
The future interaction around the Taiwan Strait situation will likely include strategic declarations, diplomatic communication, military deterrence, economic relations reshaping, crisis management, and other means.
中方反覆向美方阐明在台湾问题上的严正立场，是想表明：如果美方继续打 “台湾牌”，持续操弄“新两面手法”甚至是“新模糊政策”，那么美方想要谋求的“竞争管控”就不会成功，台海局势很可能成为美国新的战略负担，美国可能在对外战略方面再次犯下重大战略错误。
未来围绕台海局势的博弈很可能是一个包括战略宣示、外交沟通、军事威慑、经济关系重塑、危机管控等多种手段在内的系统博弈过程。
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Sun Chenghao, Visiting Fellow, Strategic and Security Research Center, Tsinghua University
Sun optimistically assesses that the meeting has ushered in a new phase of “re-engagement” between China and the United States.
Under the directional steering of the US-China diplomacy, the US and China have entered a new phase of "re-engagement". Although the two countries have not yet agreed on the strategic framework and positioning of U.S.-China relations, the two sides are communicating more at the professional level out of a more pragmatic goal of engagement, and the exemplary role of economic and trade exchanges, climate governance and anti-epidemic cooperation continues to emerge.
在中美元首外交的定向把舵之下，中美实质上已经进入了一种“再接触”的新阶段，尽管两国对中美关系的战略框架和定位尚未达成一致，但双方出于更加务实的接触目标，在专业层面的沟通正在增多，经贸往来、气候治理、抗疫合作等领域的示范作用持续显现。
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Zhang Yunling, China Academy of Social Sciences;
Sun Zhiqiang, School of International Relations, Shandong University
The two scholars have faith in Biden to maintain a steady hand on China, despite domestic political forces that seek to sabotage the China-U.S. relationship.
However, we also need to see that Biden, a politician with a long history in government and extensive experience working with China, knows the risks and dangers of an all-out confrontation with China. Biden has repeatedly said that he does not seek confrontation or a new Cold War, but expects tough competition (stiff competition), vowing to compete and cooperate together, competing where competition is needed and cooperating when cooperation is necessary. Nevertheless, the reality of operation is not easy. Realistically, in an environment that positions China as a strategic adversary and engages in comprehensive strategic competition, genuine U.S. cooperation with China requires seeking common ground on major interests.
不过，我们也需要看到，拜登是一名在政府拥有长期工作经验的政治家，也有丰富的对中国工作的经验，他知道与中国进行全面对抗的风险和危险。拜登多次表示，他不寻求对抗，也不寻求新的冷战，但期待艰难的竞争（stiff competition），声言要竞争与合作并存，在需要竞争的方面展开竞争，在有必要合作时合作。尽管如此，现实操作并不容易。从现实的角度来看，在把中国定位为战略对手、开展全面战略竞争的环境下，美国要与中国真正进行合作需要寻求大利益共同点。
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Jin Canrong, Professor, School of International Relations, Renmin University of China
Jin, one of the most famous IR experts in China thanks to his frequent TV appearances, says the meeting demonstrated the Biden White House’s urgency in seeking China’s help.
My hunch is that Biden has probably figured out by now that he's unlikely to be re-elected anyway, and it's a shame to come to the White House and not leave a legacy. Whether it's domestic or foreign affairs, or personal achievement, you need to work with China, and you can't do without China's help, so he took the initiative to hold this summit meeting.
Of course, there is another reason for Biden's initiative, which is that the Taiwan issue is now more tense. Biden has said in many places, the United States and China to compete, but to avoid conflict; to avoid major problems in Sino-US relations, he wants to engage in a "guardrail".
我的直觉是，拜登大概现在也想清楚了，他反正不太可能再连任了，而来过一趟白宫，没有留下点历史遗产还是很遗憾的。不论是内政外交，还是个人想获得成就，都需要与中国合作，离不开中国的帮忙，所以他就主动提出来举行这次首脑会晤。
当然，拜登主动还有一个原因，就是现在台湾问题比较紧张。拜登在很多地方都讲过，中美要竞争，但要避免冲突；为避免中美关系出现大问题，他要搞一个“护栏”。
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Huang Renwei, Fudan University
Huang invoked the On Protracted War, a classic theory formed by Mao Zedong during the war of resistance against Japanese aggression. In this theory, a protracted war is divided into three phases, strategic defense, strategic stalemate, and the strategic counter-offensive.
Huang believes that China and the United States are in the strategic stalemate phase, with a limited level of confrontation, due to restraints of U.S. domestic politics. Huang believes as the relative power between the two countries changes, so will the dynamic. Huang also predicts that in 30 years’ time, the two countries will enter a strategic stalemate with China at an advantage.
Huang Renwei said that although the strategic stalemate phase between China and the United States will be maintained for a longer period of time, it is foreseeable that the confrontation between China and the United States is limited. Because the U.S. do not have the ability and will to devote all its resources to the confrontation with China, thus limiting the scale of the confrontation. If the U.S. continues to intensify its efforts against China over a period of time, its expended resources and costs will overwhelm the U.S. itself, at which point the strategic stalemate will shift in China's favor. If the U.S. and China are locked in a long-term struggle, and the U.S. realizes that it will be difficult to change or defeat China, only then will it be possible to re-establish a balanced and cooperation-oriented U.S.-China relationship.
Huang Renwei also made predictions on several important time points when China's strength exceeds that of the United States. The first time point, China's total economic volume will exceed that of the United States in the next decade, which also means that the strategic competition between China and the United States will be the most intense and dangerous stage in the next 10 years; the second time point, China's comprehensive national power will catch up with the United States in the second decade. In the four indicators of economic resources, national defense resources, broad sense resource (soft power, international mobilization capacity) and human resources, except for population resources, China will fully surpass the United States in 2030; the third time point, China will catch up with the United States in major fields in the third decade. At this stage, a strategic stalemate between China and the United States will be formed in China's favor, with China catching up with the United States in most fields such as science and technology, military, and soft power, and possibly even surpassing the United States in some fields. At this point, the advantage of the strategic competition between China and the United States has shifted to the Chinese side, and the contrast of power between China and the United States has fundamentally changed. In order to preserve its vested interests and position, the United States will seek coexistence and co-governance with China in the international system.
黄仁伟表示，虽然中美之间的战略相持阶段会维持较长时间，但是可以预见中美之间的对抗是有限的。因为美国要把其全部资源用于中美对抗的能力和意志是有限的，这种有限性是中美对抗有限性的基本条件。如果在一段时间内美国打击中国的力度持续加大，其耗费的资源、成本将使美国自身不堪重负，此时战略相持会朝着对中国有利的方向转变。如果中美长期缠斗难分胜负，美国意识到自己难以改变或打垮中国，才有可能重新建立平衡和合作为主的中美关系。
黄仁伟还对中国实力超过美国的几个重要时间节点做了预测。第一个时间节点，中国经济总量将于未来十年超过美国，这也意味着中美战略竞争在未来10年将会是最为激烈、最为危险的阶段；第二个时间节点，中国综合国力将在第二个十年赶超美国。在经济资源、国防资源、广义资源（软实力、国际动员能力）和人口资源四个指标上，除了人口资源以外，中国将在2030年全面超过美国；第三个时间节点，中国将在第三个十年在主要领域赶超美国。这个阶段上将形成对中国有利的中美战略平衡，中国在科技、军事、软实力等大部分领域赶上美国，部分领域甚至可能超过美国。此时，中美战略竞争的优势已经转移到中方，中美的实力对比发生了根本性变化，为了保住既得利益和地位，美国将寻求与中国在国际体系中共存共治。
This newsletter is compiled by Yang Liu