Top Chinese IR experts on China-U.S. relations under Trump
Transcript from a lively panel featuring Wang Jisi, Yan Xuetong, Zhang Yuyan
On Jan. 12, Tsinghua University’s Institute of International Relations held a panel focusing on the China-U.S. relationship and the global order in the aftermath of the U.S. Presidential election.
The 2-and-a-half-hour long panel, part of the World Peace Forum Winter Series, featured leading Chinese IR scholars in China, Yan Xuetong, Wang Jisi, and Zhang Yuyan, and was moderated by Li Bin.
Yan Xuetong is a distinguished university professor at THU and a foreign member of the Russia Academy of Science. He is the Dean of The Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University. He has recently published a piece titled Why China isn’t scared of Trump on Foreign Affairs.
WANG Jisi is a Professor at the School of International Studies and President of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies, at Peking University. He has been the Peking University Boya Chair Professor since 2017. He is honorary president of the Chinese Association for American Studies. He has written many times for Foreign Affairs.
ZHANG Yuyan is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)
Li Bin is a professor at THU, where he is in charge of the Arms Control Program. He is on the editorial board of Science & Global Security, the editorial board of Nonproliferation Review, a board member of the China Arms Control Association, and a board member of the China-U.S. Friendship Association.
In the interest of Beijing Channel readers, below is an exclusive English translation of the panel’s transcript. The transcript has been edited for concision.
Part I Opening Remarks
Wang Jisi
The positioning and characterization of Sino-US relations are very clear. Both China and the U.S. view each other as major strategic 对手. In English, the U.S. side often uses the word "Rival". Therefore, I believe "对手" is a more accurate description—seeing the other as a primary strategic competitor and also as a main security threat.
When I say that China considers the U.S. its primary security threat, I have indeed written articles expressing this view. Additionally, I have written that the U.S. is the biggest foreign security threat. However, this does not represent the official stance; it is my personal opinion.
This kind of strategic posture may last 10 years or even decades. Some people refer to the Cold War, which lasted 43 years. The Sino-U.S. relationship entered a similar state of confrontation about 10 years ago and may last as long as the Cold War, or even longer. Of course, I might not see the end of it. Some might wonder what the endgame of it will be, I believe there might not be an endgame, at least not one during my lifetime.
About a decade ago, I wrote an article with an American friend (Kenneth Lieberthal), Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust. The greatest distrust from the American side, as they express it, is the belief that China's goal is not only to enhance its international status and achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation but also to weaken America's hegemonic position. In their eyes these two goals are inseparable. In other words, when I told Americans that we do not intend to do anything to the U.S. and that we just want to strengthen ourselves, they didn't believe me. They said that based on decades of observation, and increasingly so, they believe that we want to weaken the U.S.
The greatest distrust from the Chinese side is towards what is known as the "Four Nos and One No Intention". (The United States does not seek a new Cold War, does not seek to revitalize alliances against China, does not support “Taiwan independence”, does not support “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan”, and has no intention to have a conflict with China) Are these statements true? To a considerable extent, they are not telling the truth. Is the U.S. trying to contain China? I think most Chinese say that the U.S. is trying to contain China, aiming to weaken China's political or leadership system. This kind of mutual distrust has now become deeply ingrained and will continue to deepen, leading to a zero-sum mentality—what I gain is your loss, and what you gain is my loss. This kind of thinking exists on both sides.
The official Chinese position is that the two countries should respect each other, coexist in peace, and pursue win-win cooperation. At least openly, the Americans haven't embraced this proposal. The U.S. characterizes Sino-U.S. relations as strategic competition, which the Chinese do not accept. As a scholar looking at this issue, I think the Chinese side presents it as a vision, hoping for it to be that way. However, the reality isn't like that yet; it's an ultimate goal. The U.S. side is describing the status quo, which is strategic competition.
Secondly, what are the reasons for the changes or the continued deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations? Some people say it's the "Thucydides Trap"—as long as China's power rises and US power declines, the U.S. will worry and seek to contain China. I can’t say it's completely unreasonable, but I don't think it's a decisive factor.
The reason is that I think the changes in the balance of power haven't been fundamentally or radically transformative; China is still China, and China's strength remains very strong. China’s power is second only to the U.S. in the world and surpasses all other countries by a wide margin. As for the United States? It won't decline quickly. Can Trump fundamentally enhance U.S. power? I don't think so. I recently read an article by two American scholars, Jude Blanchett and Ryan Hass. They co-wrote the piece "Know your rival, Know yourself," meaning you need to know your enemy, know your opponent, and know yourself. The main focus of their article is on the state of Sino-U.S. relations. I think they would agree with my characterization of Sino-U.S. relations. They describe in considerable detail the changes occurring in China and in the United States. Whether what they say is right or wrong can be discussed separately, but I believe they have captured the essence of a problem: these two countries are undergoing profound changes.
How should we view Sino-U.S. relations in the future? I think it depends on the changes happening within both countries, not just the balance of power but also, the changes in global politics.
Finally, let me talk about Trump's coming to power. Let me say this: Trump has overestimated his own strength and status. There’s an element of bluster to the things Trump says, and some of it might be things he genuinely wants to do. But he will at most have four years in office, I don't think it's possible to complete everything he wants to do. I believe it's beyond his capability. Many people take his words very seriously. Personally, I don’t want to take every word of his so seriously. What’s important is what he does after taking office, not what he says every day.
When it comes to relations with China, once Trump takes office, China needs and should communicate with Trump’s team to understand who they really are and what they intend to do. This will definitely be different from Trump's first term and different from Biden’s approach, so there is an opportunity for mutual understanding and communication. During this period, if there aren’t any sudden incidents like the balloon incident two years ago, we may just avoid the worst in the coming months. At least that’s my hope. At the same time, economic cooperation may continue, at least to some extent, cultural exchanges might develop, and military exchanges shouldn’t be completely cut off.
I think the possibility of a Sino-U.S. war is very small, and peaceful coexistence is achievable. The conflicts are mainly concentrated in the economic and technological fields, and there may continue to be disagreements in many areas. However, militarily, I believe both sides are unwilling to go to war and have the ability to control themselves from doing so.
Recently, in my interaction with Americans, they are concerned about three major issues. However, I can’t say if these are the main concerns after Trump comes to power. What I can say now is that the issues the U.S. side is focusing on. First, the South China Sea issue, which involves military relations between both sides, or whether a crisis management mechanism can be established. Second, Americans are very concerned about cybersecurity, saying that some organized Chinese hackers have attacked U.S. websites. Many people in the U.S., including the current Secretary of the Treasury, have raised these issues. Third, the relationship between China and Russia. China’s cooperation with Russia, such as the use of Chinese technology and dual-use products in Russia’s conflict with Ukraine, is a concern. They hope China won’t provide Russia with such support. Will Trump immediately address these issues once he takes office? I can’t say. At least for now, these are the main concerns from the US side.
Zhang Yuyan
What kind of relationship will Trump have with the Biden administration? I used a simple expression called “B规T随,” which is derived from “萧规曹随” (a Chinese idiom meaning to follow established rules). Here, "B" stands for Biden, and "T" stands for Trump. Trump has continued many of Biden's policies, specifically in terms of China policy. (Zhang is basically saying Trump will follow Biden’s footsteps on China)
The Biden administration’s national security strategy explicitly positions China as the only country capable and willing to change the current international system. The strategy states that we are “in the early years of a decisive decade for America and the world”. This sentence is short but loaded. What does this mean? I understand it to imply that within ten years the result of strategic competition will be clearly determined. The strategy continues to say that “The window of opportunity to deal with shared threats, like climate change, will narrow drastically”. This is the Biden administration’s national security strategy’s assessment of the overall global situation, which directly names China. Their top priority is to seek and maintain comprehensive superiority over China. Most likely, the Trump administration will continue this set of China policies. From the officials he has already appointed, whenever they talk about China, they use the same rhetoric and tone. I don’t think there will be significant changes.
Though we don’t need to hang onto Trump’s every single word, based on what we have already grasped and heard, and after our analysis, China should still analyze what exactly is said by Trump.
First, Tariffs. The two largest economies in the world combined account for over 40% of the global GDP. Currently, the average tariff is 20%. If tariffs are increased by another 60%, it would be unprecedented, and the impact on the world is obvious.
Second, in the Technology Sector. Since China has been positioned as a competitive adversary, there will be stricter controls on high-tech industries, especially those related to security. It is feared that more severe restrictions will be implemented, including on exports. This applies not only to the export of American high-tech products and technologies but also extends to allied and partner countries.
Several people have already proposed canceling China's Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR), which is simply known as Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status. This would have a significant impact. With the two largest economies involved, canceling MFN status would set a very bad precedent.
Yan Xuetong
I want to discuss Trump’s impact from three perspectives. First, on the values of globalization. Second, on the development of the digital economy and economic globalization. Third, on the diplomatic strategies of various countries.
Let’s start with values. If you look at Trump's vote counts, in 2016 he received over 60 million votes, and in 2020 he received 74 million votes but lost. It wasn’t because he did a poor job over four years; his support increased by more than 10 million despite the loss, and this time it increased again to 77 million. This fact indicates that whether Trump wins or loses, the trend of supporting Trump’s populist values in the U.S. is on the rise. In other words, it’s very likely that populism is not only an upward trend over these eight years but may continue for a longer period after Trump. These values are opposed to liberal values. As seen in many of his policies, he opposes globalization, which is driven by liberal values. After the Cold War, at least domestically in the U.S., populist values are on the rise, competing with liberalism for influence. My personal feeling is that within at least the next ten years, liberalism in the U.S. is likely to be in decline. Its influence is decreasing rather than increasing. After the Cold War, liberalism quickly rose to prominence, but under the impact of populism, its influence was gradually waning. This struggle has reached a point where populism may have greater influence than liberalism. It’s possible that four years from now, populism will be the most influential value system in the U.S., surpassing liberalism.
We find it strange that Trump's election has made the entire world anxious—not only America’s competitors and enemies but also its allies are tense. My understanding is that Trump may represent not only the rising populist forces within the U.S. but also the rising populist forces globally. In Europe, for example, populism is also rising rapidly, with many populist leaders coming to power. This means that the liberal values promoted by the U.S. after the Cold War, such as "human rights above sovereignty," are likely beginning to decline. Globally, populism is rising to replace the previously dominant liberalism. It’s not that liberalism has disappeared; it still exists, and other value systems still exist, but populism has become the dominant value. Therefore, the global anxiety stems from the belief that changes in values will not only alter the U.S. but also potentially change the world.
For instance, the concept of economic security has become globally popular. All major powers have accepted economic security as a priority. Security is now prioritized over development. This shift changes the global value system, making economic security the dominant concept instead of focusing solely on development or striving for cooperative win-win or mutually beneficial outcomes. Countries begin to strive not for absolute gains but relative gains—either I gain more than you or lose less than you. This changes the fundamental way of thinking.
Regarding China, in the economic and technological fields, conflicts between China and the U.S. will be significant. Trump’s administration might exacerbate these conflicts. However, in the political and ideological realms, the situation might not be as severe as during Biden’s period. Why? Because Trump is a populist, the most pronounced conflict during his tenure is not between liberalism and socialism but between populism and liberalism. As populism mainly targets liberal political figures, Therefore, the ideological conflicts between China, the U.S. might not escalate as severely as in the economic and technological areas.
However, the impact of populism is likely to have significant social effects. There are two layers to the China-U.S. relationship: one is the relationship between the official governments of China and the U.S., and the other is the relationship between the general populations of the two countries. Historically, even when governmental relations between China and the U.S. were tense, grassroots social relations remained relatively stable and were less affected. This is why improving Sino-U.S. relations often starts with people-to-people exchanges. Both sides prioritize fostering these exchanges because they are stable. However, with the rise of populism, social relations between China and the U.S. might deteriorate because populism fosters strong xenophobic sentiments, an exclusionary mentality, and a desire to cut off external cooperation. Populists believe that all domestic problems originate from abroad, and any connection with external entities brings trouble. The rise of populist values will likely result in both governmental efforts and social relationships being strained. Recent reports show that the University of Michigan has stopped cooperation with Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Berkeley has ceased collaboration with Tsinghua University, and Georgia Tech has halted cooperation with the Southwest University of Technology. The reason is that Congress stated these collaborations harm the U.S. and pose security threats. I predict that when Trump takes office again, Chinese student visa approvals will decrease once more, reversing the trend of recovery and increase seen during Biden’s administration. Therefore, the rise of populist values in the U.S. and their global spread will lead to worsening people-to-people relations between China and the U.S. This is my view: not only will governmental relations suffer, but social relations will also face significant damage.
When Trump takes office, he will likely accelerate economic deglobalization, leading to further fragmentation of international markets. Originally, globalization was moving towards a unified global market, but now there's a trend towards deglobalization and market fragmentation. Trump's administration will exacerbate this trend by adopting protectionist trade policies to protect the U.S. market.
If the world's largest economy adopts measures prioritizing domestic consumption, other countries will likely follow suit, protecting their own markets first before allowing foreign products. This rise in trade protectionism leads to reciprocal retaliatory measures: if one country imposes tariffs, the other does too.
With regard to Biden’s “small yard high fence“ approach, I believe some of Trump’s policies may not entirely differ from Biden’s. In certain aspects, Trump might continue some of Biden’s approaches, especially in China policy. Trump will likely inherit Biden’s China policy and push it to the extreme. The intensity of opposition will increase. Trump might even view Biden’s approach as insufficiently secure and believe that the safest approach is to fully domesticate the supply chain, which would be even more secure than the “high walls” policy.
The third impact might be on the diplomatic strategies of major powers. Since the end of the Cold War, major powers have increasingly emphasized cooperating as much as possible in areas where collaboration is feasible, especially in the economic field, believing that such cooperation doesn't harm anyone. One thing everyone agrees on is that we can no longer engage in the old-style territorial expansion and power politics. In other words, it's acceptable to go to war, but the purpose of the war must be political rather than territorial.
But now, a new trend has emerged where the principle of sovereignty seems less stringent, and the purpose of war appears to be territorial conquest. Comparing the Syrian and Iraq wars, the Iraq war, in which Saudi Arabia also participated, but it didn’t seize Iraqi land for itself. However, in the Syrian conflict, Turkey took control of the northern region after the war, and Israel seized parts of Eastern Syria. Wars now are about occupying territory. Trump has stated that he also wants to occupy territory, whether he will actually do so is uncertain, but saying it out loud confirms his intentions. In the past, such thoughts were considered politically incorrect, but now they are no longer deemed politically incorrect. After Trump takes office, major powers' diplomatic policies will increasingly revert to power-based choices, meaning more reliance on violent means to resolve territorial disputes. This is an unfavorable development trend.
I don’t think there will be another world war. After all, we are now in the nuclear era. Nuclear weapons can prevent both the post-nuclear Cold War era and a new world war. I believe that as long as new technologies do not render nuclear weapons ineffective, they will continue to serve as a deterrent against direct wars between nuclear-armed states.
Currently, major powers adhering to the rule of not using nuclear weapons remains an established norm and mutual understanding. I believe this rule will continue, at least maintaining its role in preventing direct wars between major powers for another ten years. If major powers were to engage in direct war, it would escalate to nuclear war, bringing great danger. If there is a proxy war, moving from proxy conflicts to direct wars requires crossing a significant threshold. This is why, despite NATO and the U.S. providing extensive military support—even secretly deploying some military personnel—they publicly claim non-involvement.
Based on the above, I would like to summarize three points:
Deglobalization will intensify but it will not revert to the Cold War era. In other words, the international order we face in the future will neither be the post-Cold War globalization order nor the Cold War order that prevailed for forty years after World War II. Instead, it will be a deglobalization order with its own characteristics, distinct from both globalization and Cold War orders. My view is that major powers will not engage in war with each other; instead, they will only experience localized conflicts in specific areas, unlike the Cold War period when the U.S. and the Soviet Union were engaged in a pervasive cold war worldwide.
We are in the digital age. The digital age is characterized by the fact that wealth primarily comes from digital technologies, and the digital economy has become the main source of wealth for major powers. Some argue that the digital economy already accounts for over 50% of the U.S. GDP, while in China, it is said to be close to 40%. The exact figures may vary, but there is no disagreement that the proportion of the digital economy in major powers' GDPs is continuously rising. This means that Trump, under any circumstances, will prioritize technological competition. His China policy will undoubtedly consider how to prevent the technological gap between China and the U.S. from narrowing, which he views as the core issue. Although his strategies may differ from Biden's—for example, Biden might seek to organize a group of countries to exclude China, while Trump might argue that such an approach is unreliable and instead push for bringing production back to the U.S. and establishing a complete domestic industrial chain—the main objective remains to prevent the technological gap between China and the U.S. from closing, which I believe is still central.
We are in an age of changes. Everyone, both major and small countries, is aware of these changes and must reform. Strategic competition between major powers has now entered a new competitive field: comparing which country can better adapt to the historical trend of deglobalization through reforms that align with development trends. Successful reforms will enhance a country's strength while failed reforms will lead to decline.
Part II Q&A
Q: Will there be a war between China and the U.S.?
Wang Jisi: To respond, the possibility of armed conflict still exists and may not be insignificant. However, both sides still impose some self-limitations, which is very important. Both sides are restraining themselves and do not want such crises to occur, even though it would be too easy to provoke them if they wanted to.
I believe there are still many rational factors at play. That is to say, even if armed conflict occurs, both sides might stop quickly.
Yan Xuetong: I believe that armed conflicts between major powers could lead to accidental clashes ("擦枪走火"), but personally, I think these accidental incidents won't escalate into full-scale wars. The possibility of accidental clashes between major powers is increasing. However, as long as major powers are willing, they can prevent these accidental clashes from escalating into wars. Over the years, we've seen countless accidental clashes that did not lead to wars.
From the perspective of war, the competition between China and the U.S. is likely to resemble the Cold War in one aspect. If this competition period lasts 40 years, similar to the Cold War, the early stage will be more tense than the later stage, with more military conflicts occurring in the early phase and fewer in the later phase. Why? As Professor Wang Jisi mentioned earlier, some people in the U.S. are very anxious and want to achieve victory within ten years. To do so, they resort to more extreme measures. If they say, "We can't achieve victory in ten years, let's take our time," the intensity won't be as high. During the Cold War, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union wanted to achieve victory within ten years, thinking they could catch up with or surpass the other in that timeframe. However, after twenty years of confrontation and competition, they realized that ten years wasn't enough to resolve such a large-scale global strategic competition. As a result, in the later stages, since they didn't know when it would end, their strategies became relatively milder. So, Professor Wang Jisi's point gives me the insight that the next ten years might be a period of rapidly increasing intense competition, becoming more competitive as time progresses, and then becoming relatively more relaxed after this period.
That poses another question, would conflicts or proxy wars lead to another Cold War?I don't think the competition between China and the U.S., which centers on technology rather than ideological expansion, will lead to a Cold War. The core of the Cold War was expanding one's ideology and political system through proxy wars, winning over more countries, and changing more of them to enhance one's competitive edge. However, China and the U.S. are not trying to expand their ideologies to improve their national digital competitiveness. Proxy wars won't enhance your capabilities or expand your market in the global digital economy. War can't solve these issues. Especially with Trump, it seems he doesn't have as strong an intention to expand ideology globally.
Q: How will Trump’s coming to power impact the multi-lateral mechanism?
Yan Xuetong: Over the past 30 years, under the liberal ideology, many institutions have been established. We are accustomed to them. However, I believe that the effectiveness of these liberal-established institutions is declining. They are increasingly not being seriously followed or enforced by various countries. In my imagination, this trend will lead to new arms races, which have already begun to some extent, especially concerning unmanned weapons systems. In the trade domain, the "Three Zeros" (zero tariffs, zero barriers, zero subsidies) are no longer the focus of consensus-building efforts. On the battlefield, the rules were that civilian infrastructure was not attacked. However, the Gaza conflict has changed this, meaning that future laws of war might not enforce these battlefield rules as strictly as before.
I believe environmental protection might be even more significantly affected. In the past, regardless of circumstances, efforts made by anyone in environmental protection were appreciated. In the future, however, people might no longer view it this way. They might no longer see producing electric cars as a politically correct move but rather as a way to dominate foreign markets. The perception has changed, and it's very likely that the familiar institutions we know will be significantly weakened.
Q: If Trump pursues an isolationist foreign policy, what will it mean for China?
Yan Xuetong: if Trump adopts an isolationist policy focusing on the Americas—specifically South America and the North Pacific—and neglects other regions, this would strengthen the United States' position in the Americas. Conflicts with China in South America and North America would increase, leading to greater conflicts within the U.S. market itself.
If the US withdraws from other regions, it could create many new conflicts and tensions, which would not be favorable for China's economic development.
On the notion that a retreating U.S. would open new opportunities for China, it would depend on if China can grasp those opportunities. If a major power withdraws from a region, you have to ask whether the benefits of their withdrawal outweigh the drawbacks. If they withdraw because the drawbacks are too great, you have to ask if your entry won't bring similar drawbacks. When the previous power withdrew, did it leave more trouble or more opportunities? Therefore, you can’t say whether it’s good or bad that the U.S. enters or withdraws from a region, it requires a case-by-case analysis.
Q: What will the China-Russia-U.S. power structure look like under Trump?
Wang Jisi: Regarding Sino-US-Russia relations, the status quo is that China and Russia are very close, the relationship between China and the US is relatively distant, and the relationship between the US and Russia is even further.
The current situation raises the question: What exactly is the U.S. going to do? As you mentioned earlier, there are indeed people, including some domestically, who think that the U.S. wants to ally with Russia to suppress China. Given that Trump is now taking office, there is a possibility that the relationship between the U.S. and Russia might change. But firstly, can Trump truly represent the entire United States? Does what he says automatically become U.S. policy? I think there is still a significant gap here. Will Trump significantly improve relations with Russia and bring Russia over to his side to fight China? I see absolutely no possibility of that. I don't believe such a scenario is feasible. What the U.S. might do instead is pursue what is called a "double strike" or even "double containment," simultaneously suppressing China and Russia. However, this approach would likely lead to China and Russia further strengthening their relationship, which the U.S. would dislike but cannot change. If the U.S. tries to use China to oppose Russia, it knows it cannot achieve this; similarly, Russia opposing China is also unfeasible. Therefore, I emphasize that the basic structure of Sino-US-Russia relations will remain unchanged, at least in the foreseeable future. China now is in a relatively advantageous and comfortable position. The U.S. may hope that we can distance ourselves a bit from Russia, while Russia certainly hopes to deepen its relationship with China and expects China to take certain actions. I do not see the possibility that Russia and the U.S. would team up against China. I simply do not see it.
Q: How will Trump change the U.S.-Japan-ROK alliance?
Zhang Yuyan: I don’t foresee fundamental changes. There will be some adjustments. For example, the proportion of payment for stationed troops might change because the U.S. has vested interests. Additionally, the U.S. will have higher demands on these countries in other areas. These are things that might cause discomfort for U.S. allies, However, overall, I don’t think the U.S.-Japan alliance or the U.S.-South Korea alliance will change significantly.
Q: Could Elon Musk play a role in shaping China-U.S. relations?
Wang Jisi: I’m not familiar with this person. Some people think he should have a positive impact on Sino-U.S. relations, but the Americans I’ve interacted with don’t necessarily share this view. In other words, Musk collaborates a lot with China, knows Chinese people, and has visited China many times. This is certainly a good thing, as he is a businessman with high-level technological expertise who is now also entering the political arena. However, we cannot equate one person's attitude toward China with the entire U.S. policy. Moreover, as far as I know, he also has a competitive relationship with China. His cars compete with Chinese cars in some way, obviously. Is he planning to invest in Tesla in China long-term, or will he leave after reaping some benefits? The situation I’ve heard about is quite complicated, so I believe we cannot place our hopes for Sino-US relations on one individual.
Yan Xuetong: Regarding whether individuals can influence the international landscape in this era, it is possible only for those who hold power. Trump is an individual who, as the leader of the world's most powerful country, can influence changes in the international situation. For those without power, influencing the international situation is almost impossible.
Q: If this round of strategic competition between China and the U.S. would last decades, how should China prepare itself?
Yan Xuetong: I believe that Sino-U.S. strategic competition began when the U.S. began its “pivot to Asia“. The message was clear, it positioned China as the main strategic competitor, although he did not use the term "rival." This competition has been ongoing for 14 years now. What has been welcoming during these 14 years is that neither side has engaged in proxy wars, which was unimaginable during the U.S.-Soviet competition at the time. We should draw on this successful experience and continue this trend.
Q: How should China cope with deglobalization?
Yan Xuetong: I personally believe that deglobalization began in 2017, making it over seven years now. It started with Brexit—the United Kingdom leaving the European Union, which marked the beginning of deglobalization. The U.S.-China trade war arose because the two largest economies, the US and China, entered into a trade conflict, making the world feel the impact of deglobalization. Over these seven years, China has dealt with two U.S. administrations. Both sides realize during this period internal reforms are decisive. This aligns with the saying, "When a country reforms and its neighbors do not, it can become a hegemon." If you do well and they do poorly, you can thrive; if you do well and they do better, they will still outpace you. So, the emphasis is on developing ourselves, focusing on our own development as the main direction, with diplomacy serving our development.
To continue this line of thinking, I feel China must continue with our path of reform and opening up—the most fundamental political line we have been following since 1978. Persisting with reform and opening up is a principle that can bring us opportunities and enhance our chances of success in competing with the U.S.
This poses a new problem for us. In the past, studies focused on how to reform and open up under globalization, and how to engage in external cooperation under deglobalization.
Q: If Trump were to meet the DPRK leader again, how should Beijing respond?
Yan Xuetong: Trump’s past meetings with the North Korean leader have resolved some crises. From this experience, Trump’s meetings with the North Korean leader are positive for peace on the Korean Peninsula, not negative. Their meetings prove that a large-scale conflict is unlikely. Northeast Asia has been peaceful since the Korean War ended in 1953. This long-lasting peace in Northeast Asia surpasses that of Southeast Asia. If Trump resumes meetings with North Korean leaders, I believe it should be encouraged to maintain the existing long peace.
Q: Is Trump a transactional leader? How should Beijing deal with a transactional figure?
Yan Xuetong: I’m afraid more academic study is needed to determine whether Trump is a transactional leader. Just because he has been in business for many years doesn't necessarily mean he is transactional. Diplomacy between countries is always transactional as it involves negotiations. From a diplomatic perspective, many times it's a process of making deals.
So the question becomes is there room for cooperation between China and the U.S. I believe there is still room for cooperation, such as in managing crises in the Taiwan Strait. Since the Bush era, both China and the US have been managing this region, and no war has broken out. In the previous administration with Trump, we continued the policy of crisis management and maintained peace in the Taiwan Strait. Therefore, this administration could still potentially work with Trump on managing issues in the Taiwan Strait.
Regarding AI, currently, we are negotiating political principles for the development of AI technology with Biden's administration, intending to manage it to prevent harm to all of humanity. That does not change as Trump comes into office so we may continue to discuss AI principles.
In the context of the Ukraine war, ending the war would benefit China. If Trump wants to end the war, we would not take an inconsistent stance against him.
Additionally, on the issue of drugs, China's drug prevention policies are very strict. We have been assisting the U.S. in drug control, and the Ministry of Public Security is still saying they are cooperating with the U.S.
Therefore, even after Trump takes office, there remains a lot of space for cooperation. Many matters require cooperation due to mutual interests; both sides recognize that they cannot avoid cooperation.