What's with Chinese foreign ministers' obsession with Africa?
China-Africa relationship, where it stands and how it got here 1/2
One of the biggest events happening now on China’s foreign policy front is arguably State Councilor/FM Wang Yi’s visit to Africa.
The Foreign Ministry reminded everyone that this would be the 31st consecutive year that Chinese FM’s chose Africa as their first foreign visit of the year.
In light of this, your host thought it would be a good opportunity to examine what is perhaps one of China’s most consistent foreign policy practices, and then take a look at where China-Africa relationship stands as of now.
This will be a two-parter. This newsletter will focus on the accomplishments while the next one will identify some of the hurdles in China-Africa relationship. Hope the info provided in these newsletters will be of some help.
First things first, Chinese FM’s routine of starting the new year with a visit to Africa, when and how did it start?
The tradition started in 1991, when former FM Qian Qichen visited Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania in January.
Qian himself told reporters in 1995 that ever since becoming foreign minister in 1988, he would “visit a few African countries at the beginning of the new year,” but open record suggested it was really 1991 when the ritual started.
Qian’s remarks to reporters suggested that kicking off the new year with a trip to Africa was somewhat of a personal decision, rather than intending to set a precedent for his successors. As the years went by the tradition stuck, as each of his successors studiously followed in his footsteps.
Your host did his best in gathering all the information on these new year trips, and would like to report on a few discoveries.
Since 1991, the five FMs who held office visited a total of 138 countries during their new year visits, averaging about 4.5 countries per trip. The most number of countries visited on one trip was in 2007, when FM Li Zhaoxing visited seven, and the least was one, when FM Yang Jiechi only visited South Africa at the beginning of 2013.
Every African country was covered on these new year trips, with the exception of three, Somalia, South Sudan and Eswatini. For Somalia, China did not have an embassy there between 1990 and 2014 due to its civil war. For South Sudan, the country only gained independence in July 2011, FM Yang Jiechi visited shortly after. Eswatini is the only African country that does not have diplomatic relations with Beijing.
The most visited countries during the new year trips were Nigeria (6) Ethiopia (6) and Kenya (5), reflecting their importance in their respective regions. （SADR, which is not an UN member, is not counted）
The FMs chose their destinations for a variety of reasons. As a matter of principle, they try to space out visits to any particular country, so that no country would be visited two years in a row. They would try to touch on different regions during their tenure, or even within one trip. For instance Qian visited four Eastern African countries in 1991, so for 1992 all of his six destinations were in the Western part of the continent. For FM Wang Yi’s trip this year, The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation noted in a report that the five countries were located in “Western, Central, Southern, Eastern Africa with the additional one being on the Indian Ocean.”
Other factors may include marking the establishment of bilateral ties (South Africa, 1998), celebrating anniversaries of establishing relationships (Zimbabwe, 2000) , signing important papers (Nigeria, 2017), or preparing for a upcoming head of state visit (South Africa, 2013).
According to people who are familiar with the decision making process, the FM’s personal preferences, or even good personal relationship between the FM and the ambassador to a certain country can also shape the itinerary.
The consideration behind such a long lasting tradition has many folds.
First, culturally the Chinese public has always viewed Africa through a friendly lens. Since Mao’s era, China-Africa friendship was heralded as a priority of China’s foreign policy. Practically all Chinese school children were taught about the Tazara railway, built between 1970 and 1975, as a symbol of friendship. A quote attributed to Mao, saying “it was our black brothers who lifted us into the United Nations”, also circulates widely in Chinese internet to this day, despite some historians denying Mao ever said this.
Second, politically Beijing often looks to African countries for support on controversial issues in multilateral mechanism, such as when 22 countries penned a joint letter to the UNHRC attacking China’s Xinjiang policies in 2019, 17 African countries joined 20 others in defending China, saying the accusations against Beijing were “politicizing human rights”.
Third and perhaps the dominant factor is commerce and trade. Bilateral trade exploded in recent decades. According to official figures, bilateral trade is now 20 times what it was in 2000, while China’s FDI to Africa is 100 times more. China has also built 6000 km of railroad, 6000 km of paved road, 20 ports and more than 80 power facilities.
In 2015, China raised its relationship with Africa to “Comprehensive Strategic and Cooperative Partnership” (全面战略合作伙伴), one of the highest levels in China’s foreign relations classifications.
To translate the relationship to plain English,
“Comprehensive” means both sides are aligned on multiple fields, such as politics, economy, culture or military.
“Strategic” means the relationship carries a strategic importance.
“Cooperative” mostly emphasizes on the economic importance of the relationship.
“Partnership” means both sides have reached a certain level of mutual trust, and do not have major differences regarding each side's major interests.
On a bilateral level, China’s relationship with each African country varies. About half of African countries maintain normal diplomatic relationships with China, while the other half maintain some versions of partnership on top of normal diplomatic ties.
The partnerships are mostly a combination of the four keywords above, with a few outliers. It should be noted however, the official determination of the partnership does not necessarily strictly reflect on each country’s relationship with Beijing.
Your host did his best to obtain the latest updates on the status of the relationship, but given the information was gathered from different channels, there may be inaccuracies. In such cases I apologize in advance and welcome any corrections.
Comprehensive Strategic and Cooperative Partnership
Mozambique (2016), The Republic of the Congo (2016), Senegal (2016), Guinea (2016), Sierra Leone (2016), Ethiopia (2017), Kenya (2017), Namibia (2018) and Zimbabwe (2018)
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership （全面战略伙伴）
South Africa (2010), Algeria (2014) and Egypt (2014)
Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership （全面合作伙伴）
Liberia (2015), Gabon (2016), Madagascar (2017), Uganda (2019)
Tanzania (2013) and China maintain a “comprehensive partnership of mutual benefit and win-win cooperation（互利共赢的全面合作伙伴）”, while Equatorial Guinea (2015) and Sao Tome and Principe (2017) both maintain “a comprehensive cooperative partnership featuring equality, mutual trust, and win-win cooperation” (平等互信、合作共赢的全面合作伙伴）with China. These can be seen as a variations of a comprehensive cooperative partnership with an emphasis on “win-win”, arguably one of China’s favorite foreign policy vocabularies.
Strategic Partnership (战略伙伴)
Nigeria (2005), Angola (2010), Sudan (2015), Morocco (2016), Djibouti (2017)
The DRC (2015) maintains a “strategic partnership of win-win cooperation” with China, a variation of strategic partnership.
All Weather Partnership （全天候伙伴）
In a call in June 2020, Chinese President Xi Jinping described China’s relationship with Burundi as an “all-weather partnership”. Your host is not sure what to make of this peculiar categorization, and welcome your insights.
Your host would just note that most of the bilateral relationships were raised to their current status after Xi became Chinese president, underscoring how much China-Africa relationship have accelerated in recent years.
More TK
This newsletter is penned by Yang Liu, founder of Beijing Channel
Quite insightful. Thanks for sharing.