Why Xinjiang's labor transfer program ≠ forced labor

Chinese companies receiving transferred labor deserves the benefit of the doubt

Recently I visited Xinjiang to get to the bottom of one question, is Xinjiang’s labor transfer program a form of forced labor?

Why is that an important question? Let me back up a little.

The United States enacted the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) in late 2021 which created an entity list that includes Chinese companies that the United States believes violated the UFLPA. Once included in the entity list, the Chinese company would be banned from exporting its goods to the United States.

The entity list included a section called “A list of entities working with the government of Xinjiang to recruit, transport, transfer, harbor or receive forced labor or Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or members of other persecuted groups out of Xinjiang”. In practice, any Chinese company that is found to have received government-organized transferred labor from Xinjiang is penalized.

The companies say the penalty is unfair, and some are filing lawsuits, demanding removal from the sanctions list.

So, who is right on this? After months of research, I’ve come to believe that at present, government-organized labor transfer programs participated by minority ethnic groups in Xinjiang (including Uygurs, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz), should not be equated to forced labor and that the United States government should not indiscriminately penalize Chinese companies that receive organized Xinjiang laborers in the name of combating forced labor.

This newsletter will try to offer a holistic introduction to government-organized labor transfer programs in China and Xinjiang in particular. How it started, evolved, was executed, and what result it brought forth.

I. The beginning of government-organized labor transfer programs in China

Sizeable labor transfer in China, in its broadest sense, has existed ever since the reform and opening when people enjoyed greater freedom of movement. In a natural process of looking for better job opportunities, people moved to more prosperous areas to pursue a better life.

It’s difficult to pinpoint when the government first played a role in the transfer of labor, but it’s likely in the 1980s in the form of grassroots government innovation, rather than a top-down directive that initiated government-organized labor transfer nationwide.

Yours truly got hold of a book published by Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region’s Agriculture Department in 1989 that discussed the region’s labor transfer. It notes in the preface that

据有关部门统计近几年每年输出农村劳动力已初具规模，继续做好工作，力争输出更多农村劳动力。

According to official statistics, in recent years the export of rural laborers has become sizable. [We should] Continue to improve the work, strive to export more rural laborers.

and that it is the opinion of the department that

从长远考虑，要积极创造条件，采取各种形式把农业剩余劳动力最大限度地转移到非农业部门；对易地转移劳动力更有计划有组织地进行，促进农村商品经济发展，振兴宁夏经济。

Taking the long view, [we should] actively create conditions and use various means to transfer surplus agricultural labor to the non-agricultural sector to the maximum extent possible; The cross-region transfer of labor should be carried out in a more planned and organized manner, to promote the development of the rural economy and to vitalize the economy of Ningxia.

Incidentally, in 2021 a hit TV series Minning Town (《山海情》) dramatized a (real-life) 1990s government-backed initiative to alleviate poverty in Ningxia, including programs to have laborers in Ningxia work in Fujian province and Fujian experts assisting Ningxia in upgrading its agriculture.

Similar stories took place in practically all underdeveloped regions, particularly Western provinces, such as Yunnan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Gansu, and Qinghai, and over time, the practice becomes more mature and is used by various local governments to alleviate poverty in their regions.

That is to say that from its origin, government-organized transfer of labor was not targeted at any ethnic group, religious minority group, or any specific region, but appeared and widely accepted as an effective method to combat poverty.

Based on numerous academic research, the government's attitude toward labor transfer took a course of change, beginning with discouraging, to acknowledging, approving, encouraging, and finally organizing.

Why the change in attitude? On a macro level, the role of various levels of government in China changed drastically after the reform and opening, and growing the economy has become the utmost imperative, and transferring labor to where there are jobs is crucial to raising income levels.

On a technical level, the unorganized labor migration is viewed as slow and often ineffective. In practice, rural dwellers often only venture to more prosperous regions when someone in their village or family has done so and become successful, but this sort of “chain migration” can only inspire a limited number of rural laborers to resettle. On the other hand, government-endorsed or organized programs could have a much wider reach.

In addition, unorganized laborers face much higher risks due to their unfamiliarity with a strange city or region. They could fail to find a suitable job, be scammed, cheated by dishonest employers, run into legal disputes, and in some cases hit language barriers or face various discrimination. Government-organized labor transfer program solves all of these problems. They could be seen as a training wheel that allows these laborers to familiarize themselves with the more developed regions in a safe setting, or these programs could be viewed as a sort of collective that safeguards the interest of the laborers.

II Purpose of labor transfer

After decades of practice, the transfer of labor, part of which is government-organized, has proven to be a success story in China’s development. It is instrumental in helping China eliminate absolute poverty in 2021 and contributes to shrinking the development gap between various regions in China.

The purpose of these labor transfer programs is primarily to lift people out of poverty, this has not only been stated in official documents but also in all academic research that examined labor transfer-related policies or practices approach the issue from a socio-economic point of view.

To be sure, there is a small minority of research that drew a link between labor transfer programs and enhanced social security, especially in some border regions, but the logic is still an economic one: social security can be achieved when local people lead more prosperous lives thanks to the participation of labor transfer programs.

There are also other un-monetary benefits gained through labor-transfer programs, such as improved women’s rights and a greater emphasis on education. This newsletter will expand a bit on these secondary benefits later.

III Labor transfers in Xinjiang

Labor transfer in Xinjiang underwent three phases.

•Before 1992, strict regulations severely undermined the transfer of rural laborers.

*Despite policy barriers, many Uygurs have started to trickle into Eastern provinces to start businesses. Small Xinjiang communities began to emerge in Beijing in the 1980s and gradually grew in the 1990s. Many Xinjiang people ran restaurants or pushed food carts selling Xinjiang-styled food such as meat skewers. In the 1986 Spring Festival Gala, Chinese comedian Chen Peisi depicted a food vendor pretending to be Uygur in a skit, demonstrating that Uygurs have gained an image as food vendors in the East by 1986.

•From 1993-2002, the government rolled out a series of policies to “approve and encourage the cross-region movement of labor and the exportation of labor from impoverished areas”.

*It’s worth noting that during this period, while policies regulating the transfer of labor gradually relaxed, the movement of labor was primarily within Xinjiang. The Xinjiang government was still wary of the negative effects of outgoing labor. In a 2000 document, the Xinjiang government explicitly warned that “Those who went out to work but couldn’t find a job should be persuaded to return; Those who went out because of the hardship of life should be assisted to overcome difficulties……This way, the outflow of labor would be reduced.”

A 2000 study by the National Bureau of Statistics showed that between 1993 and 2002, Xinjiang practically had almost no export of labor, but had a net import of labor from Henan, Sichuan, and Gansu provinces.

•From 2003 onwards, Xinjiang saw large-scale transfer of labor. Organized labor export to other provinces started in the second half of 2006. In 2009 and 2010, government-led labor transfer to other provinces continues to grow.

*In 2003, the State Council issued a directive on better facilitating rural labor migrating to urban areas to find work (《关于做好农民工进程务工就业管理和服务工作的通知》), and in Jan. 2004, Xinjiang set up a leadership group to spearhead the labor transfer process.

It should be noted that due to the sheer size of Xinjiang, various local governments devised different mechanisms and played varying roles in facilitating labor transfer.

For example, according to one labor transfer study focusing on Moyu County, Hotan Region published in 2013, various local governments in Xinjiang exchange labor demand information in an internal bulletin, and township officials would then relay the information to villages. This mechanism operates with the principle of “voluntary, non-arbitrary, come and go as one wish“, and mainly serves seasonal agricultural labor demand within Xinjiang.

Another mechanism is called a “labor association“and is operated under the umbrella of a village party branch in Moyu. This particular labor association was set up in 2009 and absorbed more than 1400 members. The association would extract an annual membership fee of 6 yuan (in reality covered by a few local business owners), and facilitate its members to work in other provinces. This village association has chapters in the Xinjiang cities of Urumqi, Korla, and Alar, as well as Sichuan and Hubei. The association provides basic relief for family members of its members in times of emergency, and legal support for its members.

The transfer of labor in Xinjiang shares some similar traits with other regions, but its distinctive geographical, ethnic, and custom features present unique challenges to the transfer of labor.

In discussing these challenges, this newsletter will focus especially on Southern Xinjiang (南疆), which is the most impoverished, Uygur-concentrated, and resource-scarce region in Xinjiang.

1. Lack of education. Southern Xinjiang has a lower education level than the national average, meaning that fewer people hold degrees of secondary education. One 2018 publication says the illiteracy rate in Southern Xinjiang is in the double digits, and that college degree holders only make up 2.4% of the population. Most of the population commands little to no Mandarin. Being a traditional farming region, most people in Southern Xinjiang lack the professional skills to work in other fields, limiting their ability to find jobs other than gastronomy, trading Xinjiang products, and simple labor.

2. Conservative mentality. Due to religious and cultural traditions, communities in Southern Xinjiang are observed to be conservative. Some are reluctant to leave their home to work in a non-Muslim region; some may feel that the fate of man is ultimately decided by a deity and it’s not man’s purpose to strive for a better life; some hold the opinion that women should tend to house chores and not work in a public space.

3. Reliance on state subsidies. One research found that some expect the state to offer assistance to their village or region, and do not believe they ought to leave their village to find jobs.

4. Isolated violent incidents have created mistrust and stigma against Uygur workers in other provinces.

5. Due to strict land regulations, leasing farmland to others is difficult. This leads to some farmers dividing their time between farmwork and seeking jobs elsewhere.

All of these hurdles call for government involvement. During earlier years, Xinjiang government involvement mainly took form in three ways, providing language/skill training, optimizing regulations and policies to foster a more labor transfer-friendly environment, and direct monetary support, such as tax deductions for businesses that hire transferred labor.

Now governments are pressured to find more job opportunities for their residents in Eastern provinces, many often rely on “pairing assistance“ partners. According to one expert yours truly interviewed in Urumqi, tracking down suitable jobs is the duty of prefecture-level governments. After they secure the jobs, they distribute the slots to counties and then townships and villages.

The expert reflects that it’s often difficult for the prefecture government to secure jobs in Eastern provinces since their Xinjiang laborers sometimes do not meet the skill requirements of manufacturing plants, and businesses are reluctant to take on the additional cost to accommodate Xinjiang worker’s ethnic or religious needs, such as operating a canteen to serve halal food.

This is where the “pairing assistance“ program comes in, each prefecture would have a partner city in the East that in theory should bear the responsibility of receiving Xinjiang laborers, and there’s a great number of public reports on labor transfer cooperation inked under this mechanism.

The expert notes that in general the job opportunities afforded by these labor transfer programs do not meet the demand for work. However, there are some cases where some villagers are reluctant to participate for reasons such as the belief that women should not leave home to work, and the local officials may try to persuade them.

The expert says in the complicated reality of grassroots, it can’t be ruled out that some local officials may appear to be rough or even issue verbal threats, but he says such actions are a matter of working method of individuals, rather than systematic. Most importantly, the expert says the officials have no real means to follow through on the threats.

The expert’s observation is collaborated with empirical research by a 2022 publication. The research interviewed a random sample of 510 laborers from Southern Xinjiang, the result showed that 455, or almost 90% of the respondents, said they were willing to be transferred out of their home region for a job.

The research also found that both genders expressed similar willingness to participate in labor transfer programs. If you recall that it was mentioned above that in Southern Xinjiang there’s a belief that women should not leave the household, this research shows that this belief does not represent the true attitude of women, but instead the reflection of patriarchal power.

Perhaps counterintuitively, the research indicated that 92 % of ethnic minority laborers welcomed labor transfer programs, while only 84% of the Han laborers felt the same. The study also showed that those who have accepted Mandarin or other forms of training are more accepting of labor transfer programs.

In another related research focusing on participants of labor transfer programs published by Jinan University in 2021, 70 Xinjiang ethnic minority workers in Guangdong were interviewed. All interviewees said they came to Guangdong voluntarily, but their motivations varied.

15% said they are attracted by the natural and social environment, 36% pointed to high income, 24% said encouragement and support by family and friends, 13% said better education resources, 8% said it’s an opportunity to learn Mandarin and working skills, and 5% say they are here to broaden their horizon.

The research discovered that Xinjiang workers in the Eastern provinces are a close-knit group and actively share information among themselves regarding work demands. It’s common for a Xinjiang worker to introduce family or friends to work in the same factory if working conditions and pay are reasonable.

The Xinjiang expert mentioned above says, participants of the government-organized labor transfers to Eastern provinces usually sign contracts lasting 1-3 years. Normally the workers would return home each year for vacation, sometimes the fare paid for by their employers. The experts say most workers choose to return home after their contracts are complete, and the employer typically agrees to keep those who hope to stay on its payroll.

IV Benefits of the labor transfer programs: expected and unexpected

First and foremost, the transfer of labor greatly contributed to the economic well-being of families in Xinjiang, particularly Southern Xinjiang.

According to Xinjiang official figures, income created by transferred labor reached 13 billion Yuan in 2013, compared with just 1.3 billion yuan in 2004. In 2004, 1 million person-times participated in labor transfer, while 2.72 million person-times participated in 2013.

Another set of data that offers a more microscopic view of three populous counties in Southern Xinjiang, Moyu, Shufu, and Shule reveals the same picture.

From 2008 to 2011, the combined income of transferred labor of the three counties doubled from 0.4 billion yuan to 0.84 billion yuan. In 2011, income from transferred labor made up 29.5%, 44%, and 18.3% of the personal income of the three counties respectively.

Another set of figures looks at the per capita disposable income of rural residents of five Southern Xinjiang prefectures from 2008 to 2017.

Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture: from 5,800 to 16,337 (Yuan)

Aksu Prefecture: From 4,313 to 10,982

Kizilsu Kyrgyz Autonomous Prefecture: From 1,695 to 6,524

Kashgar Prefecture: From 2,870 to 8,013

Hotan Prefecture: From 2,226 to 7,441

Labor transfer programs are one of the main reasons contributing to the rapid growth of personal income in these regions.

In the Jinan University report mentioned earlier, researchers found that the 474 Xinjiang ethnic minority workers who were employed by the 5 studied Guangdong companies earned a monthly wage of between 4500 and 5500 yuan, the average being 5010 yuan. That is to say, these workers earned between 49500 yuan and 71500 yuan per year, with an average of 55110 yuan.

According to 2019 figures, Xinjiang's per capita disposable income is 23,103 yuan (34554 yuan for urban residents and 13122 yuan for rural residents). This set of data shows that workers who participated in labor transfer programs earned a significantly higher income than the Xinjiang average.

Participating in labor transfer also offers Xinjiang people to experience a different way of life. Here, yours truly believes personal stories included in the Jinan University report can best illustrate that unique experience.

Interviewee 41 (Kazakh): “After arriving here, I came to realize that the world is so big and has developed so much. I thought to myself when I first came here, my first 30 years of life was wasted. I haven’t seen anything, and only know of raising sheep. Sheep raising is really a matter of luck, good luck in the spring will mean more lambs. Bad luck on the other hand can be life-costing.”

受访人41（哈萨克族）：“到这以后才知道原来世界这么大，已经发达成这样了，我刚来的时候就说呢，自己过去三十年白活了，什么都没见过，就只会放羊，以前放羊么说实话就是看运气的事，运气好了春天就多些羊羔，运气差的话转场死人也不是没可能。”

Interviewee 42 (Uygur): “Our factory is very large, when I first came here, I felt like I was living in a movie. Since I came here, I have seen a lot of foreigners, such as Russians, Indians, and Japanese, and some others I can’t tell where they are from. These people would tour the factory, and it was very interesting for me, because I had only seen foreigners on TV before, and I felt that it was a different world.”

受访人42（维吾尔族）：“我们厂规模很大的，我刚来的时候感觉自己生活在电影里，一来就见到好多外国人，比如俄罗斯的、印度的、日本的还有我说不上的一些国家的人，这些人都会来厂区看，我就很感兴趣嘛，因为以前只在电视上见过外国人，感觉到了不一样的世界。”

Interviewee 43 (Kyrgyz): “I used to herd sheep and never went out of my village, so this opportunity given by the government is a chance for me to come out and see the world. The income from sheep herding is not bad, but after getting used to working in this kind of factory, I don’t want to return to sheep herding. When I herd sheep in the mountains, I would find a stone and huddle beside it to sleep, here the condition is much better.

受访人43（柯尔克孜族）：“我以前就是放羊嘛，从来没出过我们村，政府给的这个机会就成了我出来见见世面的机缘了。放羊收入也还好，但是在这种工厂干习惯了就懒得再去放羊了。在山上放羊，到了晚上就是随便找个石头边儿，裹着衣服就睡了，哪有这么好的条件。”

Interviewee 44 (Kyrgyz): “Not to mention the fact that girls are better at making up and dressing up, and learning how to dress fashionably, even us men pay more attention to our outward appearance. In the past, I used to wear a piece of clothing all the time, anyway, I was like that, the same outfit for two or three weeks, here every day I change, I never wear something two days in a row. Also here I realized that I must work hard, or my contract may not get renewed.”

受访人44（柯尔克孜族）：“别说女生更会化妆打扮了，学着这边的人穿得很时尚，就连我们男的也更注重自己的外在形象了，跟上了时代的进步。以前一件衣服穿上了就一直穿着，反正我就是那样，一件衣服两三个星期，在这里每天都换，穿了一天第二天就不想穿了，一件衣服绝对不会连续穿两天。然后，我发现现在不努力是不行的，一定要努力，不然会被淘汰。”

Interviewee 45 (Kazakh): “For me, the best thing about being over here I think is that the people here are especially humble. Other than making money, we can learn a lot of things here too. We have a lot to learn from them, whether it's working skills or to become a better person, which we can't deny. When I went back (to Xinjiang), someone asked me how it was over here. What I say the most is that people here are very good, they are skillful at work and humble. When we started on the production line under their coaching, when we made a mistake, they won’t blame us, but will treat us with patience.”

受访人45（哈萨克族）：“对我来说，在这边我觉得最好的地方就是这里的人他们特别谦虚，在这儿除了能赚钱，还能学到很多东西，我们要向他们学的东西很多啊，不管是技术上的，还是做人方面的，这些都是我们不能否定的。回去以后如果有人问我内地怎么样，我说的最多的还是这边的人很好，技术很厉害，他们的谦虚和大度更难得，比如生产线上刚开始是他们教我们嘛，我们把一个东西弄错了，他们不会责怪说“你这个是怎么弄的！”，而是像对待自己就的孩子一样，跟你耐心解释。”

Interviewee 46 (Tajik): “When I first came here I thought I was only here to make money. But now I realize just earning money isn’t enough, I need to constantly learn new things on the job. We have a lot of places in the factory that are now using robots, they are doing all the heavy and dangerous work. if you don't learn new technologies or start a business, then the future is not good.”

受访人46（塔吉克族）：“我本来想的来这打工就是为了赚钱么，来了之后发现光赚钱还不行，还得边赚钱边学技术，我们厂子里有好多地方现在都用机器人了，比較重的、危险的活都是机器人在干，要是不去学习新的技术或者有不一样的想法去创业的话以后是发展不好的。”

According to the abovementioned expert, even if the laborers return home after a brief job in the East, they would behave differently from other village folk. They could dress in more modern clothes, bring in new ideas, and gradually influence those around them.

The expert, who has spent years working in Southern Xinjiang, notes that one very important aspect is that through labor transfer programs, the participants become more aware of the spirit of the law and more likely to protect his or her rights with the weapon of law.

Last but not least, labor transfer greatly empowers the women of Southern Xinjiang, promoting gender equality there. This is primarily because in participating in labor transfer programs, men are no longer the sole bread earners of the family and women are finding a voice in households.

Unfortunately, the gender perspective is scattered in various academic research on labor transfer, and yours truly didn’t find research that evaluated labor transfer primarily through the lens of women’s rights.

Below are two first-person accounts of how labor transfer promoted women’s rights.

Interviewee 47 (Uygur female): “Husband-wife relationships have improved since getting here. The wives are more outspoken than before. In our hometown, the women basically don't go out to work, and the men seldom find stable work, and the hours are not as clear as in the factories. When the men came home, they would ask us women 'where you’ve been' and 'what you’ve done' and so on, and they would ask in great detail and very often, and there was much more friction in the lives of the couples. But after getting here, my husband and I are not in the same production line, sometimes we meet for lunch, sometimes we don’t, he doesn’t complain. He also followed the example of his Han Chinese coworkers and started to pay attention to our wedding anniversaries, my birthdays, and so on, and would celebrate these together. Now we have more mutual respect than before.

受访人 47（维吾尔族女）：“到这之后夫妻关系更好了，女的比以前敢说话了。在我们家乡那边女人基本不会出门工作，男人工作也没什么固定的工作，时间没有像工厂这样清楚，男人一回家就会问我们女人‘去了哪里’、‘干了什么’之类的，会问的很详细、很频繁，夫妻之间生活上的摩擦也就多了。但是到这里之后，比如我和我老公不在一个车间，上班说一声就走了，中午吃饭的时间能碰上就一起吃，碰不上就各吃各的，他也不会说什么。到这里就变成，‘你跟我一起工作了’、‘我们在干一样的事情’这种地步。他还学着厂里汉族同志那样，开始上心我们的结婚纪念日啊、我的生日之类的，会一起庆祝这些，夫妻之间也会产生对彼此的尊重。

Interviewee 48 (Uygur male): “After my wife started working, she really changed, she talked and dressed differently, and she did the same work when I did, and sometimes her salary was higher than mine, and she worked very hard. So when she needs something I will buy for her. Before we had little money, the family lived a difficult life, and had no awareness to celebrate anniversaries, birthday, wedding anniversary. I had not been able to celebrate these with her, now I have the means to buy her a gold necklace, a bouquet or a cake.”

受访人48（维吾尔族男）：“妻子开始工作后真的很有变化，说话啊、打扮啊都不一样了，而且我干什么活，她也干什么活，干的时间也都一样，有的时候她工资还比我高，她也很辛苦。所以她有什么需要我都会给她买，以前手上没钱，家里经济困难，也不知道要庆祝这些纪念日什么的，过生日、结婚纪念日这些以前没能为她做过的，现在有条件了，就会送金项链啊、买个花啊、蛋糕啊之类的一起庆祝。”

After speaking to people on the ground, going over academic research, and examining interviews with participants of labor transfer programs, it’s very hard to associate the current practice of labor transfer programs with the nefarious picture of forced labor painted by some.

If anything, I hope this newsletter will at least show that Chinese companies accepting government-organized ethnic workers from Xinjiang deserve the benefit of the doubt before being slapped with a blanket sanction based on the presumption that they played a role in forced labor.

——————

References:

1. Theory and Practice of the Exportation of Surplus Xinjiang Rural Labor 《新疆农村富余劳动力外出务工理论与实践》, 2018

2. Research on South Xinjiang’s Industry Restructuring and Labor Transfer《新疆南疆产业结构调整与劳动力转移就业问题研究》，2022

3. Research of West China’s Rural Labor Transfer《中国西部农村劳动力转移研究》,2008

4. Empirical Study of Macro Allocation of Xinjiang Labor Force《新疆劳动力资源宏观配置效率的实证研究——给予农业劳动力有限供给视角》, 2016

5. Research on Rural Labor Transfer in Ningxia《宁夏农村劳动力转移研究》,1989

6. “Forced Labor” or “The Pursuit of Happiness“?——An Investigation of Xinjiang Workers in the East《“强迫劳动“还是“追求美好生活”？——新疆工人内地务工情况调查》， 2021

7. A Study of the Surplus Labors Transferring in Kuiya Village of Moyu County in Xinjiang 《新疆和田地区墨玉县奎雅乡维吾尔族农村富余劳动力转移问题探析》，2013